

INSPECTOR GENERAL OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS INSTRUCTION IS MANDATORY. This instruction implements AFD 90-2, Inspector General—The Inspection System, AFI 90-201 Inspector General Activities, and AFSOCI 90-201, Inspector General Activities. It provides guidance and procedures for conducting Operational Readiness Inspections to all AFSOC units, U.S. Air Force Reserve units when published in the AFRCIND 2, and to the Air National Guard when published in ANGIND 2.

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Chapter 1

GENERAL

1.1. Policy:

1.1.1. This chapter, prescribing operational readiness inspection (ORI) criteria, applies to Air Force Special Operation Command (AFSOC) and AFSOC gained Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) units.

1.1.2. The Headquarters (HQ) AFSOC/Inspector General (IG) conducts performance oriented inspections with a primary focus of mission accomplishment and customer satisfaction. Each situation requires command and individual decision making opportunities that should not be inhibited by criteria using an event-focused checklist. Throughout the inspection, the decision making process is observed.

1.1.3. Exemption and deviation authority for any portion of this chapter is vested in the HQ AFSOC/IG. Request for exemption should be addressed to the HQ AFSOC/IG.

1.1.4. Functional area inspectors are encouraged to create their own inspection guides to aid in the conduct of the inspection. Inspected units should not use these functional area generated guides for inspection preparation, but should train to wartime tasking. The inspection guide is a tool for inspectors and should not be construed to be a compliance checklist by inspected units.

1.2. Administration:

1.2.1. The office of primary responsibility (OPR) for this chapter is the AFSOC Vice Commander (AFSOC/CV). HQ AFSOC directorates will develop inspection criteria or changes to established criteria as the situation dictates and forward this criteria to HQ AFSOC/IGIP for inclusion in the next revision cycle to this chapter.

1.2.2. Recommendations for changes to this chapter from field units should be endorsed through command channels to the appropriate AFSOC functional manager with an information copy to HQ AFSOC/IGI. AFSOC/CV approves changes to ORI criteria.

1.2.3. ORI Reports:

1.2.3.1. The IG writes the basic and message reports after an ORI. AFSOC Instruction 90-201 lists unit responsibilities for processing inspection reports.

1.2.3.2. When an inspected unit is rated unsatisfactory, provisions of Joint Pub 1-03.3 apply.

1.3. Terms Explained:

1.3.1. Event. Operations: The composite of a specific type of employment method by weapon system, such as infiltration, exfiltration, airdrop, or weapons firing. It includes all mission planning and threat avoidance to complete the tasking, or complete task for Support, Logistics, or Medical Areas.

1.3.2. Forward Operating Base or Location (FOB/FOL). An airfield or facility used to support special operations without establishing full support facilities.

1.3.3. Latest Time for Takeoff. The latest time at which an aircraft can depart and meet mission tasking (i.e., closure, time over target, air refuel, etc.). This time is at least 5 minutes prior to the first inflight warning and must allow the aircrew to fly a preplanned route avoiding known threats in the intelligence scenario.

1.3.4. Limiting Factors (LIMFAC). Factors that limit or preclude a unit's capability to perform an assigned tasking.

1.3.5. Mission. The tasking, together with the purpose and objective, which clearly indicates the action to be taken by special operations forces. A given mission may require one or more tasks to be accomplished.

1.3.6. Objective Area/Area of Operation (OA/AO). The target area and ingress/egress routing used by special operations forces.

1.3.7. On-Time Takeoff. A departure which allows the aircraft to meet its closure at its destination or make its time over target.

1.3.8. Out-of-Play. The IG for major safety violations, improper response to threats or attacks, malfunctioning equipment, etc., which pose a serious threat to safe mission accomplishment, may declare personnel, aircraft, and equipment out-of-play. Units will not use personnel, aircraft, or equipment declared out-of-play to support ORI requirements until released by the IG. They may use these assets to support non-ORI missions.

1.3.9. Closure. All tasked personnel, aircraft, and equipment in-place at the designated location and time.

1.3.10. Safety Violations:

1.3.10.1. Major Safety Violation. An unsafe act or condition, which results in or in the judgment of an inspector, could result in, serious damage to equipment or disabling injury to personnel.

1.3.10.1.1. Serious Damage. Damage which would, in normal day-to-day non-combat operations, require repair of an aircraft before flight or repair of equipment before continued use.

1.3.10.1.2. Disabling Injury. An injury that results in, or in the judgment of competent medical authority could result in, the loss of personnel for 1 or more duty days.

1.3.10.2. Minor Safety Violation. An unsafe act or condition which results in, or in the judgment of an inspector could result in, damage to an aircraft that does not render it unsafe for flight, damage to equipment that does not render it unsafe for use, or less than disabling injury to personnel.

1.3.11. Simulation. When a unit receives direction to simulate specific actions, it will take all necessary steps, such as drafting messages, preparing documentation, reviewing checklists/instructions, and reporting simulated completion to the appropriate authority but will not complete the action. Units will maintain supporting directives, messages, and records of verbal communication for review by the inspectors.

1.3.12. Weapon System. A composite of equipment, skills, personnel, and techniques that form an instrument of combat. The term includes all the facilities, equipment, material, services, and personnel required conducting combat operations in an operational environment.

1.3.13. X-Hour. The time at which the execution order reaches the command and control function of a unit or is otherwise specified by command authority or the IG.

1.3.14. Mission Planning Cycle. A phase process to be executed in support of adaptive or deliberated targeting or operational planning. The phases, in order, are missions tasking, missions planning, mission briefback, mission rehearsal, mission execution, and mission debriefing.

1.3.15. Trusted Agent. A trusted agent is a person selected to represent the IG team during the planning/performance phase of an inspection. The following further expands this definition:

1.3.15.1. Due to the specialized nature/size of the HQ AFSOC/IG team, a certain number of personnel from the inspected unit are required to do deliberate planning for IG events both before and during an inspection. Due to his/her status as an IG team extension, he/she may be called to act for the IG without his direct commander's knowledge. However, this will be limited to IG inspection-directed events only. His status for day-to-day work should not be influenced by his special status. Additionally, since manpower/experience in the field is a limited quantity, this person will not be restricted from his normal unit support functions. Should conflicts arise, the personnel selected to perform "Trusted Agent" duty should use good judgment to separate these duties or ask for guidance from the appropriate authority.

Chapter 2

IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1 General:

2.1.1. Concept. The IG conducts ORIs of AFSOC and AFSOC gained ANG and AFRC units. When directed by AFSOC/CC, units may receive an ORI regardless of their reported combat capability. Normally, active duty units will receive an ORI approximately every 24 months with the ANG and AFRC units inspected approximately every 36 months.

2.1.2. Operation Security (OPSEC), Communications Security (COMSEC) and Computer Security (COMPUSEC). The unit is evaluated on its overall OPSEC, COMSEC, and COMPUSEC practices and use of available secure systems throughout the inspection. The AFSOC IG may task outside agencies to aid in this evaluation.

2.1.3. Safety. The unit's safety awareness is evaluated throughout the ORI. Unit commanders may cancel or deviate from any part of the ORI when conditions compromise safety. Advise the functional area inspector of the reasons for the cancellation or deviation and notify the inspection team chief in writing.

2.1.4. ORI Initiation. ORIs will reflect AFSOC's response to the JCS Crisis Action System. Units, depending upon ORI/exercise scenario, may receive an intelligence buildup and higher headquarters (HHQ) messages and telecons reflecting the phases of JCS time-sensitive planning and shall respond as appropriate. ORI initiation may not coincide with exercise messages but will begin upon receipt of notification letter from the IG at the unit inbrief.

2.2. Instructions:

2.2.1. General:

2.2.1.1. Prior to ORI initiation, commanders should manage their forces based on the intelligence buildup and exercise development.

2.2.1.2. Upon ORI initiation, all assigned personnel who are available for duty are eligible for ORI tasking. Aircraft, equipment, and personnel away from home station on HHQ directed missions/taskings are considered deployed, but may be used for ORI tasking depending on the scenario and approval from the controlling agency.

2.2.1.3. Communications:

2.2.1.3.1. Units receiving an ORI expect realistic use of command and control channels. If the unit would send a message or place a phone call to HHQ requesting support or clarification in an actual contingency or wartime situation, they should exercise these channels during an ORI. Document such communication for review by the IG. In those cases when the IG functions as the HHQ element, units should take all preliminary steps necessary (e.g., draft messages, indicate to whom phone calls would be made, etc.) when relaying requests to the IG.

2.2.1.3.2. Normally, the inspector in the unit Crisis Action Team (CAT), or the team chief, acts on coordinated requests/ communications from the unit. All unit and IG requests will be documented on an AFSOC Form 19. Inspectors will submit IG generated requests only to the CAT (or equivalent).

2.2.1.3.3. All exercise and ORI traffic received telephonically or in message form is documented and logged by the unit CAT or command post. These entries should include the time, persons contacted, and subject.

2.2.2. IG-Directed Exercises. Do not compromise safety during any IG-directed threat or attack response situation. Do not take actions that might possibly result in injury to personnel or damage to equipment, aircraft, or property. Actual emergencies take immediate precedence over any exercise play. Security forces will not be delayed, evacuated, or otherwise prevented from performing their "real-world" security mission or responses to actual situation.

2.2.2.1. The IG does not confront unit members with situations that could be interpreted as actual hostile actions. Under no circumstances should any team member attempt to compromise security plans for the purpose of conducting exercises.

2.2.2.2. When applicable, exercise responses are IAW AFI 32-4001 and AFI 32-4007 (Disaster Preparedness).

2.2.3. The following rules regarding simulations apply:

2.2.3.1. The IG approves simulations or substitutions only when it is impossible or impractical to perform actual procedures or to use specified equipment. All requests for simulations should answer the following questions and be placed on an AFSOC Form 19:

2.2.3.1.1. WHAT? (Describe the simulated task or equipment.)

2.2.3.1.2. HOW? (Describe how you will simulate the task.)

2.2.3.1.3. WHY? (Provide a brief explanation of the need for simulation and the impact if the simulation request is disapproved.)

2.2.3.2. Coordinate all simulations not expressly authorized by exercise implementing instructions or functional directives and receive IG approval prior to accomplishment.

2.2.3.3. Limit all exercise activities to the confines of the exercise area.

2.2.3.4. Prepare all messages and communications required by the exercise. Simulate and log all required off-base communication. Preface all communications with the words, "**EXERCISE, EXERCISE, EXERCISE**" and refer to events as "simulated."

2.2.4. Message Preparation and Handling:

2.2.4.1. Deliver and transmit all actual exercise messages required by the supported exercise. Messages solely for IG information will not be transmitted.

2.2.4.2. Provide a copy of all outgoing messages to the IG Team Chief.

2.2.4.3. Use the exercise terms for the actual JCS, JRX, etc. directed/coordinated exercise in which the unit is participating in conjunction with the ORI, i.e., FOAL EAGLE, COBRA GOLD etc.

2.2.4.4. CAT activation, deactivation, SITREPs and actual OPREP-3 messages will be sent to HQ AFSOC CMD CTR HURLBURT FLD FL// unless the IG gives other direction.

2.3. Responsibilities:

2.3.1. HQ AFSOC:

2.3.1.1. Designates "Trusted Agents" for ORI support, as required.

2.3.1.2. Provides qualified inspection augmentation personnel from AFSOC staff agencies and field agencies, when requested.

2.3.1.3. Develops and keeps ORI criteria current.

2.3.1.4. Ensures sufficient flying hours are available for ORI requirements.

2.3.1.5. Schedules and coordinates CONUS combat control support for units without collocated combat control/special tactics units.

2.3.1.6. Activates the AFSOC CAT or a response cell when requested by the IG and approved by AFSOC/CC, to provide wartime or contingency command and control structure and execution procedures.

2.3.2. HQ AFSOC/IG:

2.3.2.1. Schedules and conducts ORIs.

2.3.2.2. Facilitates the development of realistic ORI scenarios in conjunction with JCS, JRX, etc., exercise planners and planners assigned from the unit. Exercises are selected from available funded exercises and are not normally in addition to the units' regular exercise schedule. The exercise is selected based upon projected force levels, command and control, users, and timing. The actual detail planning is accomplished by assigned unit planners as opposed to the IG. The IG attends planning conferences to assist the unit. If portions of the unit are not tasked within the exercise, the IG will determine the best method for their inspection.

2.3.2.2.1. HQ AFSOC/IG may elect to visit the unit during other exercises to observe unit employment events. This will be accomplished and the events added to the ORI database if the major exercise does not offer enough employment events.

2.3.2.3. Sends ORI schedules and schedule changes to HQ AFIA/EM.

2.3.2.4. Provides TDY funds for augmentees.

2.3.2.5. Coordinates operating base and forward operating base ORI teams support.

2.3.2.6. Coordinates with other military services and allies for ORI supported forces.

2.3.2.7. Forecast munitions (pyrotechnic) requirements to support inspections through HQ AFSOC/SF and HQ AFSOC/LG.

2.3.3. The ORI team chief:

2.3.3.1. Ensures unit missions departing deployed locations, during all phases of the ORI are evaluated to the maximum extent possible.

2.3.3.2. Notifies the inspected unit commander in writing when the ORI is officially completed.

2.3.3.3. Gives the unit commander and staff, including the senior unit air reserve technician, an ORI critique upon conclusion of the ORI. When the IG formally outbriefs, the maximum number of unit personnel should attend.

2.3.4. Unit Commanders:

2.3.4.1. Prepare their units for their wartime mission. Assign planners to act as IG "Trusted Agents" to script exercise inputs to meet ORI objectives within the scope of the exercise scenario.

2.3.4.2. Provide operational aircraft and manpower with the necessary equipment to perform the assigned ORI missions. Coordinate with the controlling agency, as necessary, for rescheduling or cancellation of previously assigned taskings. Keep the IG informed of actions.

2.3.4.3. Send an electronic message to HQ AFSOC/DOOA with flying hours used during the ORI, within 24 hours of ORI termination. AFRC units include HQ AFRC/DOO as an addressee. ANG units include HQ ANGRC/DOH/DOM as an addressee.

2.3.4.4. Support the inspection teams IAW AFSOC Instruction 90-201.

2.3.5. Inspected units:

2.3.5.1. Grant unescorted entry into unit controlled/restricted areas to inspectors who fulfill requirements of AFI 31-61 and supplements. The AF Form 1199 series and entry authority list (EAL) for supporting verification satisfy unescorted entry requirements for inspectors. Do not impose additional identification or search requirements.

2.3.5.2. Simulate the recall of personnel on leave or TDY during the execution of emergency action checklists.

2.3.5.3. Document and provide the controlling headquarters and the IG LIMFACs that may preclude unit capability to perform an assigned task as soon as possible after receipt of tasking.

2.3.5.4. Deliver to the inspector in the unit CAT (unless otherwise noted): One copy of the following for IG review not later than X + 12:

2.3.5.4.1. All LIMFACs and operational constraints bearing on the readiness of the unit. Include critical shortages of personnel, supply, equipment, etc., which might affect mission accomplishment. Include additional LIMFACs as they occur.

2.3.5.4.2. A copy of all ORI/exercise generated mission schedules, itineraries, flow plans, etc., as soon as each is published, but not later than 4 hours prior to scheduled departure.

2.3.5.4.3. Copies of all up channel reports.

2.3.5.5. Ensure cannibalization of non-possessed aircraft or aircraft not available for the ORI is approved by HHQ.

2.3.5.6. Provide the senior maintenance inspector:

2.3.5.6.1. A ramp parking plan to include aircraft parking locations, traffic flow, and equipment storage areas (may be part of the base support plan) before closure and within 6 hours of a change at deployed locations.

2.3.5.6.2. A copy of all current maintenance operating instructions (MOI).

2.3.6. Inspected units may:

2.3.6.1. Adjust unit type codes (UTC) if authorized in the tasking directive, or when approved by the controlling headquarters. Deployed resources will not exceed tasked resources unless approved by the controlling agency.

2.3.6.2. Change mission numbers of unit organic support chalks in coordination with the controlling headquarters. Advise the CAT inspector at home station or the operations center inspector at deployed locations prior to execution.

Chapter 3

GRADING

3.1. General:

3.1.1. ORI grading is in accordance with (IAW) the basic regulation.

3.1.2. Rate each area according to the five tier capability levels.

3.1.3. Unless otherwise specified, determine ratings using the following criteria:

Outstanding	97-100 percent
Excellent	90-96 percent
Satisfactory	80-89 percent
Marginal	70-79 percent
Unsatisfactory	less than 70 percent

3.1.4. Deduct 6 percent for major safety violations and 2.5 percent for minor safety violations not to exceed 12 percent in any one graded area. The inspector will subtract the appropriate percentages against the area responsible for the violation. Two major safety violations in any graded area limit the overall rating for that area to satisfactory. In addition to safety deductions, the IG may declare a sortie unreliable when a major safety violation occurs during aircraft operations. Aircraft, personnel, and equipment may be declared out-of-play if involved in a major safety violation.

3.1.5. When unit LIMFACS impact on an ORI grade record, the IG evaluates the area to ensure proper reporting unless, in the opinion of the team chief, exceptional circumstances exist. The team chief will fully explain the impact of LIMFACS on combat capability in the message report.

3.2. Overall Unit Rating:

3.2.1. Units are evaluated in the following general areas: Initial Response, Employment, Mission Support, and Ability to Survive and Operate.

3.2.2. The unit's overall rating is determined by the compilation of the general area grades. The IG/IGI will balance all aspects of the unit's performance to determine the overall grade.

CHAPTER 4

INITIAL RESPONSE

4.1. General:

4.1.1. Initial response includes all actions required to transition from peacetime to contingency operations or wartime posture. Evaluate the unit's ability to command, control, and execute assigned taskings, including readiness posture changes, aircraft generation, deployment operations, deployment of personnel and equipment to include the handling, storage, authorization, and transportation of classified information, material, weapons, and munitions, and its continuing home station mission (where applicable). Initial response applies to all units unless otherwise specified.

4.2. Command and Control:

4.2.1. Evaluate the command and control effectiveness of the unit's CAT, command post, and all other unit control centers. Consider decision-making, direction, coordination, and reporting. In addition, consider the interaction between unit command functions, subordinate and HHQ units, as well as coordination between unit, base, and tenant organizations (where applicable and appropriate). Consider the unit's protection of classified information and operational capabilities and plans (OPSEC/COMSEC/COMPUSEC). Report the command and control performance of deployment actions.

4.2.2. CAT. The CAT is the unit's primary command and control instrument. Effective performance by the CAT is essential for successful mission accomplishment.

4.2.2.1. Readiness Action Management. Evaluate CAT management of readiness posture changes as required by AFSOC or theater directives. Determine the impact of incomplete actions. Evaluate subordinate unit control centers on their ability to complete respective local actions or comply with directives.

4.2.2.2. Direction and Coordination. The CAT makes decisions and implements directions based on information supplied by HHQ and subordinate staff members. Coordination is a continuing process during decision-making, direction, and implementation. Effective coordination within the CAT and with echelons above and below the CAT, allows the CAT to identify problems, reach effective solutions, and provide positive direction to execute those decisions. Evaluate CAT direction and coordination as they impact mission results.

4.2.3. Command Post (CP). The CP is normally the hub of unit or base command and control activities. In some cases, AFSOC units do not manage the CP and must rely on the host unit support for the CP functions. The AFSOC COMREP is the focal point for C2 issues in the CP. For units that do not manage the CP, the unit COMREP will provide a copy of the host/tenant C2 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to the inspector. In the case of a host CP, evaluate actions in regard to the support agreement and other directives and regulations governing CP operation. In all cases, evaluate the CP with respect to its support of and impact on the unit's mission.

4.2.3.1. Direction and Coordination. The CP responds to the CAT and HHQ direction and reports problems or the completed actions. Effective CP coordination with the CAT, HHQ, and unit functional work centers is essential for mission accomplishment. Evaluate CP effectiveness as the coordination and operational control point during the ORI.

4.2.3.2. Emergency Action Procedures. The CP normally receives, interprets, and notifies units of readiness posture changes as specified in theater or host command directives. The IG will not rate non-AFSOC managed command post emergency actions except for the timeliness and support given to the unit CAT. The IG will rate AFSOC emergency action messages by considering the following:

4.2.3.2.1. Emergency action (EA) checklist currency.

4.2.3.2.2. EA checklist discipline/execution.

4.2.3.2.3. Timeliness of unit notification of EA messages.

4.2.3.2.4. Readiness Action Procedures (RAP). Evaluate performance during readiness posture changes with respect to required actions and procedures outlined in MAJCOM or theater directives. Evaluate procedures utilized to monitor RAP status, completion, and attainment reporting. Determine the mission impact of incomplete actions and timeliness.

4.2.3.2.5. Subordinate Level Coordination. This area applies to functional control centers below the CAT level (excluding the CP). They are responsible to the CAT for implementing or executing instructions issued by higher authority and providing feedback when actions are complete or problem areas are identified. This also applies to key personnel at squadron level and below.

4.2.3.2.6. Operational Reports. Evaluate the timeliness and accuracy of operational reporting.

4.2.4. Status of Resources and Training Systems (SORTS). Each AFSOC unit with an AFSOC/CC approved Designed Operational Capability (DOC) statement is responsible for implementation of combat readiness reporting IAW JCS Pub 1-03.3, AFI 10-201, AFSOC Sup 1 to AFI 10-201, Host-tenant agreements, and local procedures. SORTS data provides the NCA, JCS, SOCOM, HQ USAF, and gaining commands with authoritative identity, location, and resource information for crisis actions. Grade SORTS reported capabilities for accuracy of information and timely submission of reports to host command post. Host command post is responsible for reporting to HHQ. Evaluate identified LIMFACS to ensure SORTS reportable LIMFACS are contained in SORTS remarks and reflected in the overall rating of the unit.

4.3. Deployment Processing:

4.3.1. General. The deployment portion of an ORI evaluates the unit's ability to implement the local deployment plan for deployment. This process covers the planning and all necessary actions for an air or surface movement of personnel, equipment, and consumables deploying in support of an OPLAN or contingency tasking. Evaluate medical activities to support unit deployment. Evaluate predeployment member medical screening and support to the personnel deployment functions, immunizations, threat assessment, medical intelligence processing, and preventive medicine briefings.

4.3.2. Deployment planning and execution. Evaluate:

4.3.2.1. Wing/Group deployment planning comprehensiveness, timeliness, and responsiveness to taskings.

4.3.2.2. Ability to identify required resources ensuring they are prioritized and processed in a timely manner.

4.3.3. Integration and coordination with the Installation Deployment Officer (IDO) and AFSOC units.

4.3.4. Squadrons' ability to properly execute the Installation Deployment Plan.

4.3.4.1. Identifying required resources and adjusting mobility equipment and personnel as necessary.

4.3.4.2. Assembly, preparation, equipping, and processing both personnel and equipment.

NOTE: All cargo will be prepared and certified for air transportation.

4.3.5. Deployment Control Center (DCC). Assess:

4.3.5.1. Ability to provide direction, guidance, and information to subordinate workcenters and collateral agencies as well as up-channeling information.

4.3.5.2. Ability to plan, adjusting to changes and ensuring wing, group, or squadron meets closure.

4.3.6. TCC or Equivalent Workcenter. Evaluate the TCC or its equivalent's ability to establish a continuous operation and an operational Cargo Deployment Function (CDF), Personnel Deployment Function (PDF), and Sub-Motor Pool (SMP) capable of meeting the deployment requirement. Does the unit actively manage, monitor, coordinate, disseminate, and report deployment information throughout its infrastructure? Does the unit coordinate with the DCC on transportation processing actions and problem areas? Do they ensure compliance with the Deployment Schedule of Events (DSOE) and applicable instructions? Do they protect classified information, to include operational capabilities and plans?

4.3.6.1. Load Planning. Evaluate the accuracy and timeliness of the load plans (manual and/or computerized). Do they meet the deployment requirements? Does the load plan fully use allowable cabin load (ACL) for aircraft, show passenger and cargo load displacement, hazardous cargo, and identify special requirements? Do other workcenters receive the most current load plan before load times? Does the load plan approving authority meet required certifications?

4.3.6.2. Quality Control. Does the quality control section perform a final audit on all transportation documentation prior to building required deployment files/packages, i.e., cargo courier, aircraft/convoy commander, and station file packages? Do the packages conform to applicable guidance and are they accurate and completed on time? Are all required briefings, i.e., cargo courier, aircraft/convoy commander, prepared and completed on time?

4.3.6.3. Ramp Coordinator. Evaluate the ramp management procedures. Does the ramp coordinator provide timely briefings and distribute load documentation packages IAW applicable guidance? Does the ramp coordinator maintain a log and relay all load progress times and problems to the control center for action?

4.3.7. Cargo Deployment Function (CDF). Evaluate the CDF's ability to establish and organize itself to receive, process, manifest, and load cargo. Does the workcenter clearly mark and identify traffic flow, entry control points, frustrated cargo area, and cargo hold and load areas? If an explosive marshaling area is maintained, are the explosive cargo classifications clearly marked and are there a sufficient number of proper fire extinguishers? Assess the communication flow with the TCC or its equivalent; do cargo processing and load times, problems, and distribution of cargo documentation reach the TCC in time? Does the CDF have the necessary vehicles, equipment, supplies, guidance, and Air Force Instructions to perform required tasks?

4.3.7.1. Cargo Marshaling/Inchecking. Evaluate the cargo inspection and marshaling procedures in accordance with the Base Deployment Plan and applicable cargo shipping instructions. Are necessary corrections to cargo shipping documents and equipment being completed and are changes relayed to load planners. Evaluate the inspection and handling procedures for hazardous materials. Are the loads segregated in chalk sequence at the cargo hold/ready line area?

4.3.7.2. Cargo Loading. Evaluate procedures, accuracy, and proficiency of the cargo load teams: Are teams sufficient in size, number, and skill to handle anticipated air and surface flow? Does the team have sufficient vehicles, equipment, and supplies to perform required tasks? Evaluate loads for correct tiedown procedures, cargo increments, and load plan conformity. Are required safety briefings or instructions provided to load team members before performing unique aircraft loading procedures, i.e., concurrent refueling operation, engine running on/off load (ERO), etc.?

4.3.8. Passenger Deployment Function (PDF). Evaluate the PDF's ability to establish and organize it to receive, process, manifest, and load passengers and baggage. Does the workcenter clearly mark entry/exit control points, hold areas, and have adequate seating and restrooms? Does the PDF have the necessary equipment, supplies, guidance, and Air Force Instructions to perform required tasks? Does the workcenter properly process, handle, and load passengers and baggage IAW deployment guidance and schedule? Assess information flow; do problems, changes, passenger processing/load times, baggage weights, and documentation reach the TCC and other required workcenters in time?

4.3.8.1. Baggage Processing. Assess baggage-handling procedures. Is baggage properly controlled, tagged, weighed, and marked for destination? Are passengers provided a prohibited item briefing and allowed time to declare hazardous material?

4.3.8.2. Passenger Processing and Loading. Evaluate the workcenters ability to continually control passengers during processing, transporting, and loading. Evaluate passenger manifests, briefings, and troop commander packages for accuracy and completeness. During passenger manifesting are actual weights for passengers and baggage used? Are anti-hijacking and hazardous material briefings conducted? Are briefings thorough and are changes passed on to troop commanders as required? Assess loading and delay procedures. Is reconciliation conducted between passengers and the manifests to ensure correct passengers?

4.3.9. Sub-Motor Pool (SMP). Evaluate the SMP's ability to establish and organize it to transport deployment cargo and passengers to and from units, flightline, and the DCC. Evaluate arrival of dispatched vehicles at pick-up points within the schedule times. Does the unit possess sufficient vehicles, equipment, and supplies to perform required tasks? Does the unit have necessary guidance and instructions to accomplish their mission? Does the unit have a continuous communication with the TCC and other work centers?

4.3.10. Fleet Service. Ensure tasked fleet service functions are accomplished in time for scheduled departures. (This area evaluated only when a fleet service exists and supports the launching mobility sorties.)

4.3.11. Convoy Operation. Evaluate the unit's ability to deploy under convoy operations IAW AFMAN 24-309, Chap 9.

4.3.12. Chemical Warfare Defense Equipment (CWDE). Evaluate the issue of CWDE to ground support personnel processing for deployment to chemical threat area. Evaluate proper sizing of ensembles and completeness of equipment. Equipment need not be donned during issue.

4.3.13. Medical Activities.

4.3.13.1. Evaluate deployment member screening and support to the personnel deployment function, immunizations, threat assessment, medical intelligence processing, and preventive medicine briefing.

4.3.13.2. Evaluate the medical representative's briefing on administration of antidotes and pretreatment drugs.

4.4. Deployment Processing Management:

4.4.1. Personnel Deployment Function (PDF). Ensure all deploying personnel are accounted for and properly prepared for deployment IAW the Base Deployment Plan.

4.4.2. Assess ability to maintain and operate the MANPER-B system to meet all reporting requirements.

4.5. Aircraft Generation and Deployment:

4.5.1. During the initial response, applicable units must demonstrate the ability to generate their UTC authorized or possessed aircraft, whichever is less, within the times specified in their DOC statement. The IG evaluates the wartime aviation mission of units without an aviation mobility or generation requirement during employment operations only. Units with DOC or other generation requirements validate generation by launching as tasked. Timing begins at X-hour unless otherwise specified by the IG. Possessed aircraft off station when timing begins do not count toward initial response scoring. Aircraft can be evaluated to ensure configuration and Mission Essential System Listing (MESL) requirements are met.

NOTE: After the generation period, all sorties operating from home station will be considered employment sorties.

4.5.2. Takeoff Time. The first takeoff of each generated aircraft validates or invalidates generation of that aircraft and all units' preparatory actions required during the initial response phase. This applies to both generation and mobility forces. Units may continue to perform maintenance on aircraft selected for generation to include all launch procedures leading to takeoff. The timeline between X-hour and takeoff for each aircraft will be used to validate aircraft generation effectiveness.

4.5.3. Closure and In-place Reliability. Each aircraft is reliable if it:

4.5.3.1. Is properly configured and loaded for the tasked mission prior to takeoff.

4.5.3.2. Completes all mission taskings. Aircraft aborting or diverting are reliable for maintenance considerations if they meet the other conditions of this paragraph.

4.5.3.3. Accomplishes a reliable air refueling, if scheduled.

4.5.3.4. Unless otherwise directed, arrives at its designated destination no later than closure or in-place time. In the absence of a closure or in-place time, aircraft arriving in excess of 2 hours after scheduled time are unreliable.

4.5.4. Helicopter Preparation for Airlift. Evaluate preparation of helicopters tasked to deploy via airlift.

4.5.4.1. MH-53J tear down includes all actions necessary to prepare a helicopter for loading up to and including delivery to Port Operations. Units demonstrate the capability to ship two helicopters with no major safety violations, using the time standards in Table 4.1

Table 4.1—Time Standards for Disassembly.

Disassembly - 12 hours

*Outstanding	85% or less of allotted time	(10.2 hours or less)
*Excellent	86-96% of allotted time	(10.3-11.5 hours)
*Satisfactory	97-100% of allotted time	(11.6-12 hours)
*Marginal	101-109% of allotted time	(12.1-13.8 hours)
*Unsatisfactory	exceeds 109% of time	(+ 13.9 hours)

NOTE: .1 hour equals 6 minutes

(1) For a C-17 air shipment: Subtract 1 hour from disassembly time standards.

(2) For a Space Cargo Modified (SCM) C-5, 1 aircraft will be partially disassembled, the other fully prepped. Partially disassembled aircraft disassembly time will be 5 hours. The remaining aircraft will follow above time standard.

4.5.4.2. Helicopter build up includes all actions necessary to prepare a helicopter for Functional Check Flight. Time starts when download complete and stops when the aircraft is crew ready. Units demonstrate the capability to reassemble two helicopters with no major safety violations using the time standards in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2—Time Standards for Reassembly.

Reassemble - 15 hours

*Outstanding	85% or less of allotted time	(12.8 hours or less)
*Excellent	86-96% of allotted time	(12.9-14.4 hours)
*Satisfactory	97-100% of allotted time	(14.5-15 hours)
*Marginal	101-109% of allotted time	(15.1-16.4 hours)
*Unsatisfactory	exceeds 109% of time	(+16.5 hours)

NOTE: .1 hour equals 6 minutes

(1) For a C-17 air shipment: Subtract 1 hour from reassemble time standards.

(2) For a SCM C-5, 1 will be partially disassembled, the other fully prepped. Partially disassembled aircraft reassembly time is 5 hours. The remaining aircraft will follow above time standard.

4.5.4.3. MH-60G. Teardown. 1.5 hours. Timing begins when all maintenance and operations personnel show at the aircraft with all required equipment in place. Timing ends when the aircraft is properly folded and configured for loading on the C-5/C-17.

4.5.4.4. Buildup. 1.5 hours. Timing begins when the aircraft is clear of the C-5/C-17 and parked for buildup. Timing ends when engines are started.

Chapter 5

EMPLOYMENT

5.1. General:

5.1.1. While no two special operations missions are exactly alike, the majority of employment techniques are standardized and evaluated during an ORI using the same criteria described in this section, AFSOCI 11-208, AFSOCI 11-202, and AFSOCMAN 11-1. Missions may be evaluated during a dedicated ORI scenario, major exercise, joint operation, or other simulated combat operation.

5.2. Command and Control. Evaluate command and control to determine if command leadership, resource management, coordination, and organizational control accomplished mission objectives.

5.2.1. Command Leadership. The commander of the deployed element has operational command of AFSOC forces, which provide mission support IAW AFSOCR 28-2. Evaluate the mission impact resulting from the commander's management decisions and actions.

5.2.2. Resource Management. Evaluate the mission support element's ability to meet mission objectives. Evaluate OPSEC/COMSEC/COMPUSEC procedures and practices.

5.2.3. Coordination. Evaluate coordination and flow of information up and down the chain of command, both internal and external to AFSOC forces. Evaluate coordination across functional boundaries, as well as with users, hosts, and other external agencies, for scope and adequacy. Ensure Operational Reporting is accurate and timely.

5.2.4. Organizational Control. Evaluate the establishment, integration, and control of functional control centers (i.e., air operations center, job control, vehicle dispatch, etc.).

5.2.5. Security Practices. Evaluate unit's ability to properly handle classified information/material, weapons, and munitions. Evaluate unit's effectiveness to implement security procedures commensurate with threat level.

5.2.6. Flight Following. Evaluate the CP's ability to provide timely/accurate aircraft flight following AFSOCI 10-202, Vol. 3.

5.3. Operations:

5.3.1. Grading:

5.3.1.1. Rate mission planning IAW the basic regulation, using mission planning factors found in AFSOC Manual 11-1 or JCS Pub 3-05.5.

5.3.1.2. Rate mission reliability IAW paragraph 3.1.3. and the grading criteria in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1—Grading Criteria.

1. Mission Planning (10 pts)		2. Mission Employment (30 pts)	
10	Outstanding	29-30	Outstanding
9	Excellent	27-28	Excellent
8	Satisfactory	24-26	Satisfactory
7	Marginal	21-23	Marginal
0-6	Unsatisfactory	0-20	Unsatisfactory
3. Mission Results (50 pts)			
Score each event on the 0-100 overall scale, then:			
<u>The sum of (event scores)</u> X .5 = score for Mission Results			
# of events			
4. Unit Command and Control (10 pts)			
10	Outstanding		
9	Excellent		
8	Satisfactory		
7	Marginal		
0-6	Unsatisfactory		

The sum of the four areas scores equals overall mission score.

5.3.1.3. Event. For the purpose of this paragraph, define event as the outcome of a single task assigned to an aircrew/team during an employment mission. Most special operations missions normally include multiple events (e.g., air refueling, followed by an airdrop, then a blacked-out landing). In this instance, if an aircrew/team accomplishes one event, but another event is not completed for reasons other than those described this section, include only the completed event in the database. Events are graded under the mission results section of the grading criteria. Inspectors will comment on the overall outcomes of similar events in the report.

5.3.1.3.1. Evaluate the success of each event IAW the criteria described under the specific weapon system paragraphs and this section.

5.3.1.4. Rate Electronic Warfare/Self-Defense Capability under the mission employment section of the grading criteria, as described in paragraph 5.3.5.3.

5.3.1.5. The Command and control process at unit level will be evaluated.

5.3.2. Instructions:

5.3.2.1. Units fly low level navigation routes at altitudes specified in applicable AFSOC 11-series instructions, minimum published low level route altitudes, or altitudes commensurate with the scenario threat, whichever is higher.

5.3.2.2. Weather minimums are IAW AFI 11-206 and applicable AFSOC 11-series instructions. Minimums and conditions may be simulated for ORI/exercise purposes. These will be briefed by the IG prior to the exercise or be specified in the exercise ground rules.

5.3.2.3. Units may substitute spare aircraft and aircrew.

5.3.2.3.1. MH-53/MH-60/AC-130 may use weapons loaded spares.

5.3.2.4. Units provide the IG copies of the complete aircrew folder, including flight orders, computer flight plans, charts with route of flight, threats, and target descriptions, prior to the mission backbrief/briefing for each employment event.

5.3.2.5. Airdrop actual loads and personnel whenever possible. If DZ or other conditions preclude their use, the team chief may approve the use of standard airdrop training bundles (SATB).

5.3.3. Mission Planning. This encompasses the overall unit effort to successfully utilize the mission planning cycle to plan and execute the tasked mission. Evaluate the adequacy and scope of planning. Consider the following:

5.3.3.1. Use of all available planning resources.

5.3.3.2. Timely and thorough coordination with appropriate agencies.

5.3.3.3. Proper evaluation/application of capabilities, mission requirements, and threats.

5.3.3.4. Employment/creation of an appropriate tactical deception (TD) plan IAW AFI 10-704.

NOTE: Do not plan excessive delays for timing purposes. Examples of excessive delays include unrealistic alternate timing legs, holding for time control purposes (unless approved by the team chief), and slower than normal airspeeds. Units should plan for realistic and appropriate route lengths, but in no case will the route be shorter than 5 minutes prior to the first inflight warning.

5.3.4. Mission Reliability. Evaluate the unit's ability to generate, load, and rig aircraft scheduled for employment missions. Mission reliability and success depend on whether an aircraft scheduled for an employment mission is loaded, rigged, and required aircraft systems are operational for the tasked mission prior to takeoff.

5.3.5. Mission Employment.

5.3.5.1. Low Level. Aircrew will fly (if applicable) a preplanned low level profile IAW their associated 11-series instructions. Inflight, aircrew may modify preplanned flight path when required for time control, weather, Air Traffic Control, or simulated threats and associated threat maneuvers.

5.3.5.2. Formation. Evaluate IAW AFSOCI 11-202 Volumes 1, 9, & 14, AFSOCI 11-208, T.O.s 1-1C-1-20, and 1-1C-1-29.

5.3.5.3. Electronic Warfare/Self-Defense Capability (EW/SDC). Use guidelines in AFSOCMAN 11-1.

5.3.5.3.1. Units equipped with electronic warfare systems identify mission essential (ME) systems and ensure they are installed and operational. If the ME system is not operational, then the aircrew must explain how they will negate the threats.

5.3.5.3.2. Actual or simulated airborne or ground threats will be used to develop the mission scenario and plan. The IG may observe crew response and planning against such scenario-driven threats or initiated threats to evaluate self-defense capability. The rating in the area is a function of observed tactical awareness and the employment of appropriate countermeasures.

5.3.5.4. Tactical Deception. Execute the TD plan IAW AFI 10-704, exercise directives, and the scenario.

5.3.5.5. Mission Results.

5.3.5.5.1. Airdrop. Airdrops will be evaluated. The majority of electronic drops will be to unmarked drop zones.

5.3.5.5.1.1. Drop Zone Size. IAW AFI 13-217, minimum drop zone size will be mutually agreed upon by the Air Force and using the unit commander having control of the operation/exercise. Drop zone size will vary and should be based on mission requirements, aircraft/aircrew capabilities, and items to be airdropped.

5.3.5.5.1.2. Scoring. For an airdrop event to be successful, the lead jumper of a stick or equipment must land within a 300 meter radius of the agreed upon point of impact or within the surveyed boundaries of the drop zone, whichever is less. All personnel and equipment must land on the surveyed drop zone in order to be counted as successful. IG personnel will attempt to determine the cause of each unsuccessful drop. If an unsuccessful drop is the result of an aircrew error (crew coordination, incorrect CARP or DZ coordinates, etc.) or caused by other functions of the evaluated unit (i.e., JAI, command and control), the event will be scored as unreliable. If an unsuccessful drop is caused by equipment/load malfunction, or for a reason that can not be determined, the event will be dropped from the scoring database.

5.3.5.5.1.3. Time Over Target (TOT). Score TOT as successful if within plus or minus 30 seconds; 31 seconds or more is considered an unsuccessful TOT.

5.3.5.5.1.3.1. Record TOT based on the "green light" call from the navigator.

5.3.5.5.1.4. Leaflet Drops (Psychological Operations (PSYOP) MC-130). Normally, one leaflet drop is tasked for each leaflet capable unit operating MC-130 aircraft. Evaluate either actual or simulated leaflet drops and specifically evaluate aircraft preparation and crew duties (at altitude) for leaflet dissemination. Consider the employment successful if aircrew performance results in a leaflet drop meeting mission requirements.

5.3.5.5.2. Infiltration and Exfiltration. The overall success of these events is whether the objective of the mission is accomplished according to mission tasking and the following criteria:

5.3.5.5.2.1. The approach, hover/landing, infil/exfil, and departure are graded as one event with the exception of Hot Refueling/FARRP, which is graded separately from the infil/exfil.

5.3.5.5.2.2. Time Of Arrival (TOA). Score TOA as successful if within plus or minus 30 seconds; 31 seconds or more is considered an unsuccessful TOA.

5.3.5.5.2.2.1. For Fixed Wing, record TOA based on the time during the initial approach that the aircraft passes abeam/over the touchdown zone in a position to safely land.

5.3.5.5.2.2.2. For Helicopters, record the TOA based on the time the helicopter is in a position to land.

5.3.5.5.3. Overt Airland Events (Fixed Wing). Runway criteria are IAW AFSOCI 11-202. Consider an event successful if:

5.3.5.5.3.1. For AF-marked landing zones, touchdown is in the first 500 feet of the runway and the aircraft slows to taxi speed within the available runway.

5.3.5.5.3.2. For Airfield Marking Pattern (AMP 2) marked landing zones, touchdown is in the AMP 2 touchdown zone and the aircraft slows to taxi speed within the available runway.

5.3.5.5.4. Covert Airland Events (Fixed Wing). Runway criteria are IAW AFSOCI 11-202. Consider an event successful if:

5.3.5.5.4.1. For NVG landings to either marked or unmarked runways, the aircraft is able to safely turn off at the appropriate taxiway, or stop abeam the planned onload/offload point.

5.3.5.5.5. Airland or Hover (Rotary Wing). Conduct landing/ hovers on properly surveyed LZs IAW AFSOC 11-series regulations. Hover at the minimum safe altitude to accomplish the mission.

5.3.5.5.6. Shipboard Operation. Normally, shipboard operations are evaluated during the ORI, if available. Evaluate IAW AFSOCI 11-208.

NOTE: Crews may initiate go around prior to or after touchdown. Score any touchdown prior to the touchdown zone as unreliable. Do not evaluate go arounds due to factors beyond the control of the aircrew (personnel or equipment on the landing zone, etc.).

5.3.5.5.7. Hot Refueling: Units qualified in hot refueling operations can expect to be tasked to demonstrate this capability to the IG. The IG will task a tanker for a minimum of two receivers using covert lighting and radio silence (comm out). The primary criteria when evaluating hot refueling operations is a safe and successful fuel transfer. Immediately discontinue fuel transfer for any leaks or other potentially dangerous situations. Procedures outlined in AFSOCIs 55-12, 11-202 Vol. 1, T.O.s 00-25-172 and 37A9-7-2-1, AFI 23-201, and aircraft technical orders will be followed when conducting hot refueling operations. For grading, consider a hot refueling operation reliable if the tanker:

5.3.5.5.7.1. Briefs and displays awareness of emergency procedures, escape routes, and crew rendezvous areas.

5.3.5.5.7.2. Taxies to the briefed location and follows the marshaller's signals (if available) to properly position for the refueling operation. If one is established.

5.3.5.5.7.3. Properly deploys the required equipment (which is properly checked and tested) in the appropriate pattern for the number of receivers.

5.3.5.5.7.4. Conducts refueling under NVG conditions and is ready to accept a receiver within 20 minutes from setting the aircraft brakes.

5.3.5.5.7.5. Safely transfers the prebriefed/required fuel to the receivers using proper procedures.

5.3.5.5.7.6. Properly removes residual fuel from hoses and equipment and stows equipment aboard the tanker aircraft within 30 minutes from disconnect from the last receiver.

NOTE: A hot refueling operation (tanker) may be considered successful if no fuel transfer occurs due to reasons beyond the control of the tanker aircrew (e.g., receiver aircraft fail to show). In this case, the tanker aircrew must meet criteria listed above (except a transfer is not required) to consider the event successful. If a leaking hose can be safely and efficiently removed/repared/shut-off, refueling operations may continue. An additional 10 minutes is allowed to replace/repair a leaking hose or piece of equipment.

5.3.5.5.8. Hot Refueling (Helicopter). In addition to the criteria specified in paragraph 5.3.5.5.7. and AFSOCI 11-208, evaluate helicopter hot refueling operations using the following guidance:

5.3.5.5.8.1. Receivers arrive at the hot refueling location plus or minus 2 minutes from scheduled arrival time.

5.3.5.5.8.2. Receivers taxi to proper refueling location following marshaller signals (if available).

5.3.5.5.8.3. During Hot Refueling, personnel manning refueling nozzles and hoses display proper procedures for grounding, operation of the dead-man control, and transfer of fuel. During FARRP operations, personnel display proper procedures for manning refueling nozzles and hoses, bonding and transfer of fuel.

5.3.5.5.9. Aerial Refueling.

5.3.5.5.9.1. Inflight Refueling (Fixed Wing Receiver). Task appropriate units to demonstrate inflight-refueling capability. The primary inspection criteria are a safe and successful transfer of fuel. For a single aircraft or the lead aircraft in a formation to be successful, that aircraft must:

5.3.5.5.9.1.1. Accomplish a successful rendezvous.

5.3.5.5.9.1.2. Transfer the preplanned fuel load, updated fuel requirement, or limit the transfer to not exceed maximum gross weight.

5.3.5.5.9.1.3. The prebriefed or required fuel load is transferred to all aircraft prior to the end point.

5.3.5.5.9.1.4. Score TOA at the RZCT or score TOA to the ARCT as appropriate for the rendezvous. TOAs may change inflight. Use the coordinated new TOA agreed to by the tanker, receiver, and command and control plus or minus 1 minute, as appropriate.

5.3.5.5.9.2. Air Refueling (Tanker/Receiver). Evaluate IAW AFSOCI 11-202 Volume 23 and AFSOCI 11-208, T.O. 1-1C-1-20. Evaluate the aircrew's air refueling capability as an employment event. The primary requirement is safe, successful fuel transfer to support helicopter requirements.

5.3.5.5.9.2.1. ARCT at the air refueling control point (ARCP). Aircrew should maneuver between the ARIP and ARCP to expedite the rendezvous. Time of arrival at the ARCP will not be graded if the crew is maneuvering to affect a rendezvous. Air Refueling TOAs for tankers will be on time to 1 minute late and 1 minute early to on-time for receivers. TOAs may change inflight. Use the coordinated TOA agreed to by tanker, receiver, and command and control plus or minus 1 minute, as appropriate.

5.3.5.5.9.3. Receiver malfunctions or other associated events beyond the control of the tanker will not impact on the event rating. Tanker malfunctions will not reflect on the rating of the receiver.

NOTE: External factors beyond the control of the tanker or receiver will not impact the event rating.

5.3.5.5.10. Weapons Employment, Live/Dry Fire. Weapons employment should support the framework of the exercise scenario. Each sortie evaluated must properly identify the target and select weapons and munitions appropriate for target destruction.

5.3.5.5.10.1. Record TOT based on the time the aircraft first enters the area, range, or other specified point approved by the IG.

5.3.5.5.10.2. The primary consideration for weapons employment is target destruction and timely mission accomplishment. This is a subjective evaluation based on effectiveness of fire.

5.3.5.5.10.3. AC-130. No TOT should be used. AC-130 "call for fire" is an offensive maneuver with the primary consideration for adherence to the Nine-Line Briefing, Team Identification, Target Identification, and Target Engagement.

5.3.5.5.10.4. Helicopter defensive fire suppression. No TOT should be used. Helicopter defensive fire suppression is a defensive maneuver with the primary consideration for adherence to the Nine-line Briefing, Team Identification, Target Identification, and Target Engagement.

5.3.5.6. Operations SAR/CSAR procedures. Normally the IG will task a minimum of one event. Given a mission scenario, essential elements of information, suitable means of infiltration, and Intelligence support conduct SAR and CSAR operation. Consider the event successful if the applicable following standards are met.

5.3.5.6.1. Respond in a timely manner, assist the ACC Staff in plan development and execution, operate specialized Personnel Locator System, and Infiltration and Exfiltration of SOF assets.

5.3.5.6.2. Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE). The primary purpose of the evaluation process is to ensure SERE and Evasion and Recovery (E&R) are included as integral parts of the overall planning process during contingency operations. This process should be a collective effort of the deployed units' SERE and intelligence personnel. As a minimum the following areas will be addressed:

5.3.5.6.2.1. Planning. Evaluate the ability to successfully plan for survival and evasion and recovery during contingency operations. Pre-mission briefings should include scenario specific code of conduct, climatic conditions/personal protection, and evasion and recovery information.

5.3.5.6.2.2. Equipment. Evaluate the aircrew members familiarity with basic issued equipment, as well as additional SERE related items, such as blood chits, EVCs, etc.

5.3.5.6.2.3. Execution. Field Training Exercise (FTX). In most cases the deployed unit will be tasked with a field training exercise to assess all aspects of SERE and E&R. When possible, this event should be incorporated into the special tactics mission objectives, giving the IG staff a comprehensive representation of the unit's personnel recovery capabilities. Evaluate the downed aircrew's ability to evade and affect recovery in a simulated hostile environment.

NOTE: During the field training exercise the downed aircrew must be escorted by a Pararescueman or SERE Instructor for the purpose of providing after action feedback as well as safety.

5.3.5.7. Psychological Operations EC-130 Weapons Systems. This paragraph outlines specific ORI employment criteria for special operations EC-130 units. Rate subareas IAW basic regulation except where specified otherwise.

5.3.5.7.1. Mission Planning. Effective use of the mission planning cycle should ensure successful mission accomplishment.

5.3.5.7.2. Mission Flight Profile. Aircrews must demonstrate adequate navigation to meet on-station requirements. Evaluate aircrew effectiveness against the assigned tactical electronic combat mission.

5.3.5.7.3. PSYOP Effectiveness. Evaluate on-station time based upon the time the aircrew actually supported the tasked mission versus the scheduled transmission time for tasked events. On-station time includes the period while crews may be characterizing and analyzing the signal environment or conducting ECM. Evaluate safe and effective transmitter usage and operation. Transmissions may be radiated on an approved or assigned frequency, or transmitted into "dummy load" if no frequency is available. If the aircraft is not in its assigned orbit, but is in a position from which the aircrew can effectively perform its electronic combat mission, count this time as effective on-station time. The flight profile may involve an orbit, track, or penetration route.

5.3.5.7.4. Low Level. Aircrew will fly (if applicable) a preplanned low level profile IAW their associated 11-series instructions. Inflight, aircrew may modify preplanned flight path when required for time control, weather, Air Traffic Control, or simulated threats and associated threat maneuvers.

5.3.5.7.5. Formation. Evaluate IAW AFSOCI 11-202 Volumes 1, 9, & 14, AFSOCI 11-208, T.O.s 1-1C-1-20, and 1-1C-1-29.

5.4. Maintenance:

5.4.1. Evaluate aircraft maintenance on its ability to rectify all mission essential and safety of flight discrepancies, meet aircraft servicing and configuration requirements, provide aircrews with mission-ready aircraft on schedule, and its ability to respond effectively to rapidly changing events in a dynamic environment.

5.4.2. Departure Reliability. Evaluate the maintenance complex on its ability to prepare the aircraft for deployment or mission tasking to include required inspections, servicing, and the completion of necessary maintenance actions to allow the aircraft to complete the mission. Evaluate helicopter build-up after closure.

5.4.3. Maintenance Management. Evaluate all levels of maintenance management on the overall management of maintenance resources, the ability to respond to rapidly changing events, and resourcefulness used to solve unique problems. Does the unit:

5.4.3.1. Use coordination and teamwork to accomplish mission tasking, identify potential problems, forward them for resolution, and participate in both resolution and execution of corrective actions? Disseminate information to all applicable agencies to aid decision-making?

5.4.3.2. Control communications by passing accurate, appropriate, and timely information concerning aircraft status, job progress, personnel availability, and work requirements to command and control agencies and functional areas? Maintain effective OPSEC/COMSEC/COMPUSEC?

5.4.3.3. Identify local limiting factors and properly elevate information for permanent resolution of problems? Exhaust all possible LIMFAC work-around?

5.4.3.4. Accurately identify and properly process supply requests?

5.4.3.5. Establish effective work schedules to achieve maximum capability with assigned personnel?

5.4.3.6. Effectively cross-utilize skills to handle surges and priority requirements?

5.4.3.7. Provide adequate supervision and assign personnel tasks commensurate with their skill level and training?

5.4.3.8. Ensure support equipment is serviceable, accounted for, available, and, in the case of precision measurement equipment (PME), properly calibrated? This includes deployed powered AGE, non-powered AGE, PME, tool kits, and special tools (e.g., engine change kits), as well as the support equipment furnished by the host at the deployed operating location.

5.4.3.9. Accurately control and document cannibalization actions?

5.4.4. Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR). ORI tasked units are evaluated on the effectiveness of the ABDR program. As a minimum, the IG will review the following areas: readiness of ABDR kits to deploy and availability of the ABDR trained technicians and assessors.

5.4.4.1. Effective Use of ABDR on Damaged Aircraft. Evaluate serviceability of deployed ABDR kits, and effectiveness of personnel to properly assess and repair damaged aircraft using ABDR techniques. Assessment should include all facets, which aid in determining aircraft status, estimated repair times, and mission degradation. ABDR repairs will only be accomplished on designated ABDR training aircraft or hulks.

NOTE: Ratings for management deficiencies will be determined by the mission impact of the specific deficiency in each category. For example, minor deviations in radio discipline may have little or no impact on the mission. However, poor radio discipline or OPSEC/COMSEC procedures that adversely impact the unit's ability to generate and launch aircraft may have a major effect on the mission.

5.5. Intelligence:

5.5.1. Evaluate the effectiveness of integrating intelligence augmentees.

5.5.2. Briefings. Evaluate intelligence personnel's analysis of pertinent information and how the information was tailored to specific users. Evaluate the accuracy of the information briefed. Coordination of briefing support with other staff functions (planners, operations aircrews, and team members). Knowledge and use of established briefing formats and guidelines. Use of briefing aids, when necessary, to convey critical information (e.g., IMOM products, imagery, large-scale maps, route annotations on charts, and radar shadow graphs). Consider this area successful when all pertinent information has been clearly

and accurately conveyed to the recipient. Consider this area unsuccessful when inaccurate information is briefed or information is omitted that would pose a threat to successful mission accomplishment.

5.5.3. Debriefing and Reporting. Evaluate intelligence personnel's ability to thoroughly debrief ground or aircrew, to include attached AIA (SILENT SHIELD) personnel and other sources capable of providing intelligence information. Evaluate accuracy, timeliness, and comprehensiveness of reports. Evaluate their ability to transmit and disseminate information in a timely manner to HHQ, theater, and appropriate agencies, IAW exercise, theater, or ORI directives. Consider this area successful when the information is debriefed and reported in a timely and accurate manner. Consider this area to be unsuccessful when critical information of use to decision-makers or follow-on missions is not debriefed or submitted on time.

5.5.4. Mission Planning Support. Evaluate the following:

5.5.4.1. The coordination between intelligence personnel, mission planners, command and control activities, weapons and tactics, and weapon systems planners.

5.5.4.2. Intelligence personnel's knowledge of unit mission requirements and the mission planning cycle.

5.5.4.3. Intelligence personnel's ability to provide mission planners with current, timely, and accurately analyzed survival, evasion and recovery, and threat data. Additionally, evaluate intelligence personnel's ability to assist mission planners during threat penetration analysis.

5.5.4.4. Intelligence personnel's ability to conduct research, validate requirements for submission of requests for information (RFI) and prepare and forward RFI to appropriate agencies.

5.5.4.5. Intelligence personnel's ability to effectively use intelligence support systems (CIS/AA, JDISS, IMOM, TIBS, and theater systems) to obtain and analyze all-source intelligence data.

5.5.4.6. Intelligence personnel's ability to assist mission planners with threat identification for consideration and submission as targets for Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD). Additionally, evaluate intelligence personnel's ability to provide timely and accurate updates during the mission planning cycle on SEAD actions and or status of threat related to SEAD request.

5.5.4.7. Intelligence personnel's ability to provide real/near-real-time threat updates to on-going missions. Evaluate use of Tactical Information Broadcast Service (TIBS), mission debriefs, in-flight reports, and theater-specific reporting systems.

5.5.4.8. Intelligence personnel's ability to effectively use SILENT SHIELD analysts and intelligence systems to satisfy intelligence information requirements during mission planning and execution.

5.5.5. Evaluate intelligence personnel's ability to support the threat-working group on force protection issues.

5.5.6. Evaluate intelligence personnel's ability to provide intelligence that supports unit OPSEC and COMSEC planning of mobility events.

5.5.7. Evaluate security practices used to support intelligence activities. Additionally, evaluate the procedures for establishment and operation of a tactical sensitive compartmented information facility.

5.6. Weather:

5.6.1. Evaluate the unit's ability to perform its wartime mission of providing weather support to combat operations IAW AFM 15-111. Document innovation and leadership that impact unit effectiveness.

5.6.2. Initial Response:

5.6.2.1. Evaluate the unit's ability to transition from peacetime to wartime posture. Evaluate the preparation of Special Operations Weather Team (SOWT) personnel and equipment to support deployed operations.

5.6.3. Briefings. Briefings are successful if:

5.6.3.1. The weather personnel's analysis, tailoring, accuracy, and the coordination of information to the user are all IAW AFI 15-111 and established unit guidelines.

5.6.3.2. Failure to brief all pertinent information, or a major error that would give the user incorrect information seriously impacting mission success, will result in an unsatisfactory rating for this subarea. Evaluate such items as weather effects matrices and compare them to supported unit's operations.

5.6.4. Mission Planning Support. Mission planning support is successful if:

5.6.4.1. The internal coordination and external interface between the weather unit and operations, intelligence, the CAT (or equivalent agency), CP controllers, mission planners, and command and control agencies meet applicable standards.

5.6.4.2. Unit personnel have adequate knowledge of unit mission requirements and schedule.

5.6.4.3. The unit provides mission planners with current, accurate, and timely weather information to include meteorological, climatic, oceanographic, solar, and lunar data.

5.6.4.4. Unit personnel demonstrate the ability to use available weather support and communications systems to acquire weather, climatic, oceanographic, solar, and lunar data.

5.6.4.5. Failure to interface with operations, intelligence, the CAT/CP controllers, mission planners, or failure to provide critical information and planning data that cause mission failure will result in a less than satisfactory rating in this subarea.

5.7. Aircrew Life Support:

5.7.1. Initial Response: Units will demonstrate the ability to provide adequate amounts of equipment and supplies to meet specific UTC taskings. Packages will be self-sustaining and capable of supporting all known contingencies. The following specific elements will be evaluated: (1) Equipment support capabilities and (2) Personnel requirements and availability.

5.7.2. The life support function will be evaluated on its capability to provide aircrew life support and chemical defense equipment and related support to flying personnel within the constraints of applicable directives. All deployed aircrews will have their equipment combat configured prior to the first employment mission and will be tasked to fly simulated combat missions using this equipment. During

employment, only those personnel and equipment/supplies specifically designated for mobility will be authorized for use.

5.7.3. Aircrew Equipment Serviceability and Configuration. Aircrew life support and Chemical Defense Equipment (ACDE) will be available for immediate issue to flying personnel and maintained in serviceable condition, as required by applicable equipment Technical Orders (TOs). The following elements will be evaluated: (1) Equipment Maintenance, (2) Serviceability, (3) Configuration, (4) Fitting, and (5) Storage and Control.

5.7.4. Combat Operations Support. All aircraft flown during the employment phase of the ORI and the aircrews involved will receive total support from the unit's deployed package and war readiness materiel (WRM) assets. Procedures will be established for reporting personnel casualties and reconstitution of destroyed/damaged life support equipment. Plans will be developed for equipment dispersal/protection and rapid evacuation of personnel, equipment, and supplies. Aircrew weapons issue, storage, and control procedures may be evaluated (if applicable). The following elements will be evaluated: (1) Personnel casualty reporting and equipment resupply procedures, (2) Equipment dispersal/protection, (3) Evacuation plan, (4) Evacuation capability, and (5) Aircrew weapons (if applicable).

5.7.5. Aircrew Chemical Defense Operations. An area will be established for life support operations, which provides adequate protection from contamination for personnel and equipment. Facilities will be designed and equipped to support CCA processing and equipment decontamination operations IAW applicable directives. In effectively evaluate chemical warfare defense procedures, the IG may task units to demonstrate full aircrew chemical warfare defense ensemble/Aircrew Eye Respiratory Protection (AERP) wear/suit-up procedures and/or flying operations in AERP. CCA management will provide for continuous operations in a chemical environment. The following elements will be evaluated: (1) Facilities and processing equipment, (2) Contamination control, (3) CCA management, (4) Equipment decontamination, and (5) CCA processing.

5.7.6. Rating Aircrew Life Support:

OUTSTANDING: All life support equipment must be combat configured. No combat missions lost because of life support/CWDE related problems. All programs, procedures, and activities must far exceed mission requirements and be carried out in a superior manner.

EXCELLENT: All life support equipment must be combat configured. No combat missions are lost because of life support/CWDE related problems. All programs, procedures, and activities must exceed mission requirements and be carried out in a superior manner. Few discrepancies exist.

SATISFACTORY: All life support equipment must be combat configured. No combat missions are lost because of life support/CWDE related problems. All programs, procedures, and activities must meet mission requirements. Only minor discrepancies allowed for subitems listed in paragraphs above.

MARGINAL: Two subitems less than satisfactory.

UNSATISFACTORY: Three subitems less than satisfactory.

5.8. Communications and Information:

5.8.1. Special Operations Communications Flights (SOCFs) assigned to special operations wings/groups are operationally evaluated under these criteria. The inspection team will evaluate the communications flight's ability to deploy and meet the AFsOF mission. During an ORI, any or all of the following areas may be evaluated: Command and supervision, deployment, employment, and ability to survive and operate. For the purposes of these criteria, the term "unit" will be used to denote SOCF.

5.8.2. Command and Supervision:

5.8.2.1. Evaluate the ability of the unit OIC and staff to provide proper leadership and guidance to ensure efficient and effective preparation of communications equipment and personnel for air transport, monitor unit readiness status, keep deployment actions on schedule, and resolve problem areas.

5.8.2.2. Evaluate coordination between communications personnel, unit mobility center, OSS/CC and staff, the CAT, and other command and control activities.

5.8.2.3. Evaluate unit's ability to practice good OPSEC/COMSEC/COMPUSEC procedures to prevent any information compromises. This area will be evaluated during all phases of the inspection.

5.8.2.4. COMSEC. Evaluate the unit's ability to identify, prepare, and safeguards the proper COMSEC package for deployment. Include coordination with in-place assets as part of the evaluation.

5.8.3. Deployment:

5.8.3.1. Deployment Planning. Evaluate the unit's knowledge of specific taskings in exercise/contingency plans, and their ability to identify specific taskings and communications mission requirements from the tasked OPLAN or OPORD.

5.8.3.2. Equipment preparation: Evaluate the unit's ability to properly prepare equipment for cargo handling IAW applicable safety and cargo handling requirements.

5.8.4. Employment:

5.8.4.1. Employment evaluation areas consist of the following: UTC employment and circuit activation, communications operations, and logistics.

5.8.4.2. UTC employment and circuit activation is graded on the ability of the unit to meet mission requirements, as determined by the deployed supported commander. For initial activation, one UHF SATCOM and one HF network are normally established. Depending on mission support profile, air-to-ground networks may also be established to support closing aircraft. All equipment should be set up IAW applicable TOs and AFOSH safety directives.

5.8.4.2.1. UHF SATCOM. The system, if deployed, is usually the first system to be set up. The system is considered activated when the terminal is loaded with the appropriate COMSEC, frequencies, and terminal ID, if applicable and contact is made either by voice or data with another station. If no other stations are available, activation is verified by setting up a second system and performing a check.

5.8.4.2.2. HF System. Activation timing begins upon successful installation and activation of UHF SATCOM or as determined by the communications functional inspector and the communications team chief. The system is considered activated when the terminal is loaded with the appropriate COMSEC and frequencies and contact is made either by voice or data with another station.

5.8.4.2.3. Overall Communications Systems Activation. This category covers all other communications systems required during the deployment, to include voice, data, and fax. Safety factors and specific site impediments will be given consideration. The unit may choose to activate these systems after initial UHF SATCOM and HF circuits are established, or activate them concurrently. The communications team chief and inspector will coordinate the start time.

5.8.4.2.4. Reliability. Evaluate the availability of communications support when the customer needs it. Verification of availability will be as required or requested.

5.8.4.3. Communications Operations. Evaluate operator efficiency in performing the following tasks:

5.8.4.3.1. OPSEC. Ensure all personnel are aware of OPSEC requirements/guidelines.

5.8.4.3.2. Radio Operations. Ensure traffic handling and log-keeping procedures are conducted IAW applicable instructions.

5.8.4.3.3. General Operations. Personnel should:

5.8.4.3.3.1. Maintain a log of significant events affecting unit operations.

5.8.4.3.3.2. Review and revise OIs to meet local requirements.

5.8.4.3.3.3. Comply with COMSEC procedures.

5.8.4.3.3.4. Prepare, update, modify, and execute emergency plans, to include destruction plans.

5.8.4.3.3.5. Be proficient in "lost communications" and execution checklist "over-due" call procedures.

5.8.4.3.3.6. Ability to accomplish Over-The-Air-Rekey (OTAR) with distant ground or airborne terminals. Includes ability to rekey aircraft en route. Also, be able to perform OTAR as required, equipment permitting.

5.8.4.4. Logistics. The logistics function is evaluated on its ability to effectively and accurately control and coordinate the overall maintenance effort IAW AFI 21-116, applicable technical orders, and AFOSH standards. Evaluated areas are maintenance control, production work center management, and resource management.

5.8.4.4.1. Maintenance Control. The size of the deployment package, mission requirements, and number of maintenance personnel deployed will drive the level and amount of maintenance control performed at the deployed location. The following areas will be evaluated: control of resources, enforcement of safety directives, status reporting, and maintenance action tracking/ scheduling (where applicable or practical).

5.8.4.4.2. Production Work Center Management.

5.8.4.4.2.1. Evaluate ability to provide the required serviceable equipment to accomplish the mission.

5.8.4.4.2.2. Evaluate performance of quality maintenance while complying with technical directives.

5.8.4.4.2.3. Evaluate compliance with safety directives.

5.8.4.4.2.4. Evaluate reporting on, response, and actions taken on equipment serviceability.

5.8.4.4.2.5. Evaluate ability to perform damage repair as required to ensure equipment serviceability.

5.8.4.4.2.6. Evaluate overall equipment condition.

5.8.4.4.2.7. Evaluate availability, use, and control of technical data, tools, and test equipment.

5.8.4.4.3. Resources.

5.8.4.4.3.1. Evaluate procedures for home station resupply of deployed UTCs.

5.8.4.4.3.2. Evaluate procedures for reporting equipment status and open job status in place for deployed teams.

5.8.5. Communications Planning: Planning by either dedicated personnel (air or ground) or as an "additional" function in the field will be evaluated on any or all of the following areas:

5.8.5.1. Ability to produce required communications products (e.g., CEOI, frequency matrix, etc.).

5.8.5.2. Ability to brief communications requirements to appropriate aircrew and ground personnel. Briefings may be tailored to meet mission requirements.

5.8.5.3. Availability of "operator aids" designed to designate net members, call signs, SATCOM AZ-EIs, HF azimuths, etc..

5.8.5.4. Evaluate circuit restoral priorities; are they followed?

5.8.5.5. Ability to coordinate with SOC/J6 or appropriate communications representative to resolve issues (e.g. SATCOM access, phone/circuits, or additional frequency requests).

5.8.6. Survivability; This area evaluates the unit's ability to provide continuous communications support during simulated combat situations. Depending on the scenario and scope of the inspection, this area may be scored as the overall response of the parent wing/group as opposed to just the communications unit. Exercise scenarios may include, but are not limited to, the following events:

5.8.6.1. Relocate or reestablish required communications support in the event of a bomb threat, power outage, natural disaster, loss of satellite access, spectrum interference resolution, etc..

5.8.6.2. Precautionary and total destruction of classified material and equipment, cryptographic insecurity, and computer security exercises.

5.8.6.3. Fire awareness and protection procedures.

5.8.6.4. Physical security exercise.

5.8.6.5. Ability to file proper reports resulting from any of the above.

5.8.7. Airborne Communications Support: Personnel performing communications duties on organic aircraft or specific airborne C2 consoles are operationally evaluated under these criteria. The inspection team will evaluate each platform operators' ability to effectively use communications practices and systems to meet their specific missions. Each platform has specific communications characteristics and systems that must be taken into consideration by the inspectors. During an ORI, any or all of the following areas may be evaluated:

5.8.7.1. OPSEC. Ensure all personnel are aware of OPSEC requirements/guidance.

5.8.7.2. Brevity for voice and log procedures.

5.8.7.3. Ability to receive OTAR en route or on the ground.

5.8.7.4. Proficiency in "Lost Communications" procedures.

5.9. Special Tactics:

5.9.1. Assess the Special Tactics unit's combat capability by evaluating performance in the joint/combined arena in support of a task force commander's scheme of maneuver. The ORI will evaluate areas from the unit's Mission Essential Task List (METL) which are based on the DOC statement, and OPLAN force listings. Sub-tasks associated with each METL area will be evaluated IAW conditions and standards. The 720th Special Tactics Group (STG) will publish METL and Task, Condition, and Standard (TCS).

5.9.1.1. Units should be inspected during JCS exercises, on their ability to execute realistic mission scenarios consistent with the most probable contingencies.

5.9.1.2. A successful inspection should assess the unit's ability to plan, coordinate, and execute tasked missions with joint air/ground forces.

5.9.1.3. The operation/exercise and mission scenarios should drive realistic mission tasking to effectively evaluate the unit's ability to conduct a cross-section of mission essential tasks. Completion of all tasks is not required for a successful inspection.

5.9.2. Grading.

5.9.2.1. Unit overall grading is IAW the basic regulation and this supplement. Mission employment grading is based on planning and preparation, execution, debriefing, and reporting phases of each executed mission.

5.9.2.2. Graded employment criteria is based on the unit's ability to execute unit METL IAW TCS. Weighted values for tasks and METL areas will be assigned by the 720 STG.

5.9.2.2.1. The individual conditions and standards are weighted, graded, totaled, and averaged to obtain the overall task grade.

5.9.2.2.2. The individual task grades are weighted, graded, totaled, and averaged to obtain the overall METL area grade.

5.9.2.2.3. The individual METL area grades are weighted, graded, totaled, and averaged to obtain the overall employment grade.

5.9.2.2.4. The inspection phases, Initial Response, Unit Employment, Combat Support, Ability to Survive and Operate, and Recover the Force are weighted, graded, and totaled to obtain the overall inspection grade as applicable.

5.9.2.3. Safety violations will effect the final grade IAW this supplement.

5.9.3. Additional Information.

5.9.3.1. Special Tactics units will provide IG inspectors equipment they require to tactically participate with the inspected unit.

5.9.3.2. Unit ORI planners will coordinate for administrative/ safety requirements for tactical events to include medical coverage, safety boats, assault zone coverage, etc.

Chapter 6

MISSION SUPPORT

6.1. General:

6.1.1. This section includes support functions that directly affect the unit's ability to perform its wartime mission. Two areas will be graded: Home station mission support and deployed mission support. Host base responsibilities will not be evaluated. However, host support that adversely affects inspected unit mission accomplishment may be reported as an inspection report extract finding to the corresponding MAJCOM.

6.2. Home Station Mission Support. Evaluate home station mission support procedures against the following criteria, as appropriate:

6.2.1. Intelligence. Evaluate intelligence personnel's ability to provide the commander, staff, mission planners, and the CAT with timely and accurate, all-source intelligence information.

6.2.1.1. Evaluate the ability of intelligence personnel to provide current situation and threat reporting throughout the predeployment phase.

6.2.1.2. Evaluate security practices used to support intelligence activities.

6.2.1.3. Evaluate intelligence personnel's ability to mobilize equipment and personnel.

6.2.1.4. Evaluate intelligence personnel's coordination with theater SOC and/or HHQ regarding support arrangements, reporting instructions, and procedures for requests for information and imagery.

6.2.1.5. Evaluate intelligence personnel's knowledge and application of theater tactics, techniques, and procedures.

6.2.1.6. Evaluate intelligence personnel's ability to support employment mission planning prior to deployment.

6.2.1.7. Evaluate intelligence personnel's ability to support the threat-working group on force protection issues.

6.2.1.8. Evaluate intelligence personnel's ability to provide intelligence that supports unit OPSEC and COMSEC planning of mobility events.

6.2.1.9. Consider this area successful when all critical intelligence is obtained and provided to decision makers and planners in a timely manner.

6.2.2. Supply:

6.2.2.1. Initial Response. Ensure proper UTC identification and deployment of equipment and personnel in support of the unit tasking. The following will be evaluated:

6.2.2.1.1. Personnel. Evaluation of personnel suitability is based on AFI 10-215.

6.2.2.1.2. Cargo. Evaluation of cargo suitability is based on the following preparatory elements:

6.2.2.1.2.1. Correct identification and availability of equipment to fill the logistics detail requirements of the UTC.

6.2.2.1.2.2. Proper identification, packing, marking, and documentation of all general, hazardous, sensitive, and classified cargo IAW MILSTAMP and international requirements.

6.2.2.1.2.3. Accurate increment identification markings as specified in HHQ and local guidance.

6.2.2.2. Mobility Bags. Evaluate proper processing and deployment of the unit mobility bags as prescribed in mobility plans. The following will be evaluated:

6.2.2.2.1. Configure and marshal bags to respond to the deployment tasking.

6.2.2.2.2. Ensure mobility bag assets, regardless of method of storage, are serviceable and quantities are sufficient to support deployed personnel. If assets are not available, demonstrate appropriate procedures to fill short falls.

6.2.2.2.3. Maintaining accountability at home station for mobility bags at all times using the Mobility Automated Inventory and Tracking System (MAITS).

6.2.2.2.4. Ensure mobility bags are shipped for all personnel tasked to deploy, regardless of method of assembly, issue, storage, or shipment.

6.2.2.2.5. Ensure all deploying personnel have required "C-1 mini bags" (hand-carried) CWDE.

NOTE: Mobility bags are an inclusive term, which means built up bags or bags stored/shipped in bulk.

NOTE: Unit should clarify with IG the use of real versus training CWDE assets prior to the inspection.

6.2.2.3. Weapons. Evaluate proper processing and deployment of the unit mobility weapons as prescribed in the mobility plans. The following will be evaluated:

6.2.2.3.1. Configure and marshal weapons to respond to the deployment tasking (base supply/owning organizations).

6.2.2.3.2. Ensure weapons identified by owning organizations are placed in deployed status (base supply).

6.2.2.3.3. Pack weapons properly for deployment (base supply/ owning organization).

6.2.2.3.4. Ensure weapons couriers are appointed by the unit commander and are fully knowledgeable of their responsibilities (owning organization).

6.2.2.3.5. Ensure weapons are clean and serviceable when deployed, and weapons support kits are deployed to maintain deployed weapons (base supply/owning organizations).

6.2.2.3.6. Maintain weapons security and accountability at all times (base supply/owning organizations), and ensure required listings are signed by the deploying custodians and returned to base supply prior to aircraft departure.

6.2.2.3.7. Ensure a list of weapons serial numbers is prepared for each container subject to deployment.

6.2.2.4. Equipment. Evaluate proper processing and deployment of equipment identified for deployment by unit equipment custodians. The following will be evaluated:

6.2.2.4.1. Ensure equipment reviews and subsequent deployment/ transfer actions are completed prior to aircraft departure times published in the schedule of events.

6.2.2.4.2. Ensure trained custodians are appointed and briefed prior to deployment.

6.2.2.4.3. Identify assets to be deployed (owning organizations).

6.2.2.4.4. Ensure assets identified by owning organizations are placed in a deployed status and accounted for on a deployed Custodian Authorization/custody Receipt Listing signed by the deploying custodians.

6.2.2.4.5. Ensure UTCs and increment numbers are loaded on equipment details.

6.2.2.4.6. Ensure all previously identified assets (and only those assets) are deployed (owning organizations).

6.2.2.4.7. Ensure borrowed equipment is properly deployed.

6.2.2.5. Mobility Readiness Spares Package (MRSP)/Mission Support Kit (MSK) (Supply and/or owning organizations). Evaluate proper processing and deployment of all supply and fuels UTCs, personnel, and equipment, as identified for deployment. The following will be evaluated:

6.2.2.5.1. Ensure an administrative support package is deployed with each MRSP. This package will include, as a minimum, a laptop or PC with fax/modem and CD ROM capabilities. It will also include, as applicable, R43 (Airborne MRSP Listing), R50 (Mission Support Kit Listing), R52 (Non-Airborne MRSP Listing), Dyna-Metric Microcomputer Analysis System (DMAS), and current copies of FEDLOG, AFEPL, and AFMAN 23-110 (AFGSEPL). Units may include additional items if desired.

6.2.2.5.2. Ensure MRSP are configured to respond to the deployment tasking and placed in a deployed status no earlier than 5 days CONUS, 10 days overseas.

6.2.2.5.3. Ensure all necessary actions are taken to identify critical MRSP shortages using the DMAS.

6.2.2.5.4. Ensure MRSP details are transferred to the Air Force Contingency Supply Support (AFCSS), if tasked.

6.2.2.6. Command and Control. Ensure the Supply Readiness Control Center (SRCC) maintains positive control and efficient management of all supply resources. The following will be evaluated:

6.2.2.6.1. Ensure assigned SRCC personnel, to include augmentees, are qualified and trained to perform all aspects of SRCC operations.

- 6.2.2.6.2. Monitors recall status (if applicable).
- 6.2.2.6.3. Prepare and distribute processing schedules for supply.
- 6.2.2.6.4. Direct/coordinate the movement of personnel and equipment to the processing area to include MOBAGS, RSP, and weapons.
- 6.2.2.6.5. Act as the central point of contact for all supply related questions and/or problems.
- 6.2.2.6.6. Report any shortfalls/LIMFACs to HHQ.
- 6.2.2.6.7. Ensure all military personnel subject to deployment or identified to deploy have received appropriate deployment training.
- 6.2.2.6.8. Ensure passive defense measures are in-place and sufficient training has been provided.
- 6.2.2.6.9. Communication/power outage procedures must be effective.
- 6.2.2.6.10. Expeditiously and efficiently transition unit control/work center to an alternate location without significant degradation of command and control or mission support.
- 6.2.2.7. Bench Stock. Evaluate ability to support deploying unit's bench stock requirements. The following will be evaluated:
 - 6.2.2.7.1. Ensure deploying unit's bench stock is reviewed prior to deployment.
 - 6.2.2.7.2. Ensure priority action is initiated to fill bench stocks according to established procedures.
 - 6.2.2.7.3. Ensure priority action is initiated on bench stock due-out line items that the deploying organization identifies as necessary for deployment.
- 6.2.2.8. Training.
 - 6.2.2.8.1. Ensure all personnel tasked to deploy have been trained and certified to perform all duties they will be expected to perform in the field, and that AF Form 623 is properly annotated.
- 6.2.2.9. Fuels. Evaluate fuels support in the following areas:
 - 6.2.2.9.1. Fuel support of aircraft. Observe aircraft refueling operations supporting the ORI for timeliness and fuel safety observance. Ratings will be based on timely dispatch of operators and equipment, observance of all fuels servicing operation safety procedures, qualification of operators, use of designated TOs and checklists, and the ability to control/monitor fuels servicing operations in a wartime environment. Rating period begins when fuel-servicing request is received at the Fuels Resource Control Center and will end upon fuels personnel and equipment leaving the fillstand (if required). Equipment malfunctions and non-operator related discrepancies will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

6.2.2.9.1.1. Failure to use the proper checklists is a minor discrepancy. A safety violation, which may potentially result in injury to personnel or damage to aircraft, equipment, or facilities, is a major discrepancy.

6.2.2.9.1.2. Timely fuel servicing response is defined as the time period specified in a Memorandum of Agreement/Understanding between Fuels Management and Maintenance or an Operating Instruction.

6.2.2.9.1.3. Fuel support of ORI aircraft is not staged or simulated for grading purposes.

6.2.2.9.2. Forward Area Refueling Point operations will be evaluated on the ability to support hot refueling operations IAW all applicable Tos and checklists outlined in paragraph 5.3.5.5.7.

6.2.2.9.2.1. Failure to maintain and inspect FARP servicing equipment IAW TO 37A9-7-2-1 is a minor discrepancy. Failure to perform mandatory hose testing procedures is major discrepancies.

6.2.2.9.2.2. Have procedures been established for FARP teams recall within DOC response time? Is FARP equipment maintained in a mission ready posture? Do FARP team members possess all support/personal equipment necessary for immediate response at mission load time?

6.2.2.9.3. Petroleum Damage and Deficiency Reporting (REPOL) Not Applicable to ANG. Evaluate knowledge of fuels operations damage reporting. Rate timely notification of disaster response agencies and submission of a complete and accurate REPOL within prescribed time frames. Rate the submission/transmission procedures of REPOL report.

6.2.3. Transportation:

6.2.3.1. Command & Control. Evaluate the Transportation Control Center (TCC) or its equivalent's ability to generate, gain, and maintain command and control over transportation functions, including terminal operations, ensuring communication of pertinent information. Evaluate currency and unit compliance of base/unit checklists, recall/standby rosters, and applicable emergency response publications. Evaluate unit's practice of resource security as outlined in Base Deployment plans and Installation Security Plans. Evaluate unit's management of workcenter personnel to meet mission requirements; e.g., total numbers, qualifications of transporters and augmentees. Does unit possess adequate quantities of equipment and supplies to support mission requirements, or have feasible alternative methods for obtaining such equipment and supplies? Evaluations of all functional areas apply to active duty Air Force and AFRC/ANG.

6.2.3.1.1. Vehicle Operations Flight. Evaluate unit's ability to provide adequate vehicle support to meet increased deployment requirements. This includes vehicle recall procedures, e.g., Contingency, Priority Recall, and Minimum Essential Listings. Assess unit's ability to prepare, process, and track vehicles scheduled for deployment within the deployment schedule. Assess safety and serviceability of assigned vehicles to include those prepared for deployment. Review Vehicle Authorization Listings (VAL) and Custodian Authorization/Custodian Receipt Listings (CA/CRL) to ensure Mobility and War Reserve Materiel (WRM) vehicles are properly coded and identified. Does the unit maintain and store WRM coded vehicles in accordance with their WRM category, i.e. Pure WRM (use code "D") or Joint Use (use code "C").

6.2.3.1.2. Vehicle Maintenance. Evaluate unit's pre-deployment preparation measures IAW AFMAN 24-307, Chapter 7.

6.2.3.1.3. Air Transportation. Evaluate the unit's ability to prepare and provide serviceable cargo loading equipment to meet deployment requirements. To include sufficient quantities and properly accounted for 463L pallets, nets, straps, etc.

6.2.4. Security Forces:

6.2.4.1. Home Station Security. Evaluate unit's ability to plan, sustain, and transition from normal security operations during increased Terrorist Threat Conditions (THREATCON). Evaluate the unit's ability to implement appropriate force protection initiatives. Evaluate leadership's ability to continually and expeditiously inform the security force of available intelligence information. Evaluate the unit's ability to successfully conduct security contingency actions. To meet this goal, consider conducting at least two-resource protection, two flightline penetrations, two bomb threats, and one major accident response exercise. Evaluate unit leadership's ability to manage, organize, train, arm, and equip security forces. Evaluate the unit's ability to train and integrate base security forces augmentees into the security force when shortfalls arise due to SP/UTC deployment (strive to incorporate augmentees force response into scenarios when feasible). Evaluate unit's ability to produce and properly follow established implementing instructions and checklists.

6.2.5. Communications and Information. Special operations units assigned the tasks of providing Information Management (IM), base communications (base LMR system, etc.), message center, telephone, audiovisual, and automation support to the commander and staff are operationally evaluated under this criteria. The inspection team will evaluate each function's ability to meet AFSOF mission requirements. During an ORI, any or all of the following areas may be evaluated: Leadership, ability to organize, train, and equip forces, ability to survive and operate, and preparation and support of deploying forces. Each group/wing functional area is responsible for its internal IM requirements (people, equipment, handling of their information resource). Staff support IM will be evaluated as part of the functional area they support.

6.2.5.1. Functional Area IM. Evaluate the functional area manager's ability to organize equipment, material, and personnel for deployment.

6.2.5.1.1. Evaluate IM personnel's ability to palletize and mobilize their equipment.

6.2.5.1.2. Evaluate personnel's proficiency on AFSOC-standard software.

6.2.5.1.3. Have procedures been established to coordinate with theater SOC regarding requests for information and postal support at deployed locations?

6.2.5.2. Base Communications, Message Center, Telephones, and Automation support.

6.2.5.2.1. Evaluate local base communications and computer systems support including LMR networks, message processing, telephone switch, and automation support to deployed forces.

6.2.5.3. Visual Information (VI) Support. Have procedures been established to receive reprographics equipment from the Defense Agency Printing Service, as required?

6.2.5.3.1. Evaluate VI personnel's ability to palletize and mobilize equipment.

6.2.5.3.2. Evaluate VI manager's ability to organize equipment, material, and personnel for deployment.

6.2.6. Weather:

6.2.6.1. Initial Response. Evaluate the unit's ability to transition from peacetime to a wartime posture. Evaluate the preparation of Special Operations Weather Team (SOWT) personnel and equipment for deployment. Predeployment actions must prepare the SOWT to support deployed operations.

6.2.6.2. Briefings. Evaluate weather personnel's analysis of pertinent information and how the information was tailored to specific users, the accuracy of the information briefed, coordination, use, and knowledge of established guidelines by unit personnel. Failure to brief all pertinent information, or a major error, which would give the user incorrect information seriously impacting mission success, will result in an unsatisfactory rating for this subarea.

6.2.6.3. Mission Planning Support. Evaluate the following:

6.2.6.3.1. The internal coordination and interface between intelligence personnel, the CAT, mission planners, and command and control activities.

6.2.6.3.2. Unit personnel knowledge of unit mission requirements and schedule.

6.2.6.3.3. Unit's ability to provide mission planners with current, accurate, and timely weather information to include climatology and solar/lunar data.

6.2.6.3.4. Personnel's ability to effectively use weather support systems and communications systems to acquire weather data.

6.2.6.3.5. Failure to interface effectively with CAT, staff, mission planners, and controllers; or failure to provide critical information and planning data which cause mission degradation will result in an unsatisfactory rating in this area.

6.2.7. Services. Sustaining Operations/Prime RIBS Support.

6.2.7.1. Services Management. Evaluate how well personnel manage resources, ability to respond to rapidly changing events, and resourcefulness used to solve problems. Evaluate the following:

6.2.7.1.1. Communications. Consider the timeliness and accuracy of reporting information to command and control agencies and squadron workcenters including AAFES and DECA. Consider ability of reporting personnel accountability, facility hours of operation and status, and capabilities.

6.2.7.1.2. Work Schedules. Consider management actions to adequately man facilities to accommodate the needs of the base population during periods of increased readiness and crisis responses. Consider management's ability to determine needs of reservist/IMA personnel, contract contingency clauses, and civilian overtime options to ensure the highest levels of service are maintained.

6.2.7.1.3. Equipment/Supply Management. Consider management's accountability, location and availability of serviceable equipment and supplies required to support applicable disaster response, contingency, and mobility plans.

6.2.7.1.4. Mortuary Response Forces. Consider overall management of the Mortuary Affairs Program IAW applicable directives. Consider development and implementation of plans for mortuary response for search and recovery operations, ability to recall search and recovery teams, conduct recovery operations with available team kits, and death reporting in applicable timelines.

6.2.7.1.5. Predeployment Planning. Evaluate home station training documentation and accuracy of SORTS. Evaluate written plans for home station training for completeness and realism.

6.2.7.1.6. Review unit's written procedures for alerting, recalling, briefing, and processing of personnel and equipment.

6.2.7.2. Grading. The overall grading is assigned based on the unit's collective performance during home station mission support activities and program management.

6.3. Deployed Mission Support. The Mission Support grade for a deployed location where a chemical warfare exercise is conducted will be limited to one grade higher than the grade received for Base Wide Actions under Ability to Survive. Grade deployed mission support procedures against the following criteria, as appropriate:

6.3.1. PERSCO. The IG will evaluate field operations IAW requirements contained in AFI 10-215 and AFI 36-3002. Evaluate the PERSCO team's coordination with other agencies to ensure accurate accountability of all deployed personnel.

6.3.1.1. Casualty Reporting. Evaluate IAW requirements contained in AFI 36-3002.

6.3.1.2. Strength Accountability. Evaluate procedures established for requirements contained in AFI 10-215. Ensure the timeliness and accuracy of reports.

6.3.1.3. MANPER-B Operations. Ensure all updates are accomplished IAW governing directives.

6.3.1.3.1. Ensure adequate primary and backup operating locations are set up. Ensure alternate means of communications have been set up and are effective.

6.3.1.4. Evaluate documentation of Self-Aid buddy Care, CWD, and Small Arms Qualification training.

6.3.2. Civil Engineers. Functional area inspectors should evaluate the unit's capability to mobilize, process, and deploy postured CE UTCs, and the ability to accomplish wartime combat support operations.

6.3.2.1. Prime BEEF:

6.3.2.1.1. Deployment Planning. Evaluate the unit's ability to manage the recall and deployment of personnel and equipment in accordance with the Base Deployment Plan. Area includes alert recall procedures, unit assembly procedures, personnel and equipment processing.

6.3.2.1.2. Employment:

6.3.2.1.2.1. Cargo preparations, vehicle inspections, driver briefings, safety equipment, and actual convoy movement will be evaluated.

6.3.2.1.2.2. Evaluate Command and Control as it pertains to lines of communications with in place command and other support agencies, delegations of authority and responsibility, work control, resource protection, and COMSEC/OPSEC/COMPSEC.

6.3.2.1.2.3. Evaluate force beddown planning to include facility and utility siting and layout, camouflage, concealment, and deception, tent city construction methods, hardening of facilities, personal and camp sanitation, and erecting and operating field equipment.

6.3.2.1.2.4. Evaluate proficiency of the control center, damage assessment teams, and recovery teams to accomplish war damage repair. Area includes pre-identified specialized repair teams, critical facility and utility priority repair lists, war damage repair status, personnel accountability and reporting, and communications and alert notification procedures.

6.3.2.1.2.5. Evaluate proficiency of the Rapid Runway Repair (RRR) teams to provide timely minimum operating strip (MOS) selection, explosive ordnance reconnaissance, and rapid, effective runway repairs. Area includes ability of unit to assess airfield condition, identify and mark unexploded ordinances, accomplish MOS selection and demonstrate ability to assemble a RRR kit.

6.3.2.1.2.6. Evaluate the unit's ability to accomplish personnel security planning, proficiency of personnel in defensive actions, and coordination with the base defensive operations center and other defense forces. Area includes weapons familiarity, use of body armor, hasty defensive and protective positions, vehicle hardening, work party security, inclusion of fighting positions in force beddown plan, and communications with other forces.

6.3.2.1.2.7. Evaluate the unit's ability to plan and prepare for base denial. Area includes identification of mobile assets, priority list of non-mobile assets to destroy, and knowledge of both facility/utility and airfield denial methods.

6.3.2.2. Fire Fighters. Evaluate fire prevention planning and fire fighter proficiency in crash, rescue, Hazardous Materials Incident, confine space rescue, and structural fire suppression procedures. Area includes prioritization of responses, control and suppression actions, and rescue/casualty actions.

6.3.2.3. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD): EOD units will maintain the ability to meet the mission objective of their customers. The evaluation will cover as a minimum: Operational support, training/qualifications, technical operations, and logistical support.

6.3.2.3.1. The operational support areas will be evaluated with focus on mission accomplishment. Three support areas are home station mission, deployed mission and augmenting, mission support.

6.3.2.3.1.1. Evaluate the effectiveness of the planning and preparation. Example: SOPs, FOIs, team guides, SORTs, and reporting systems accurate.

6.3.2.3.1.2. Evaluate the EOD's employment process.

6.3.2.3.1.3. Proper security is enforced to include COMSEC, OPSEC, COMPUSEC, explosives, and technical data.

6.3.2.3.1.4. Evaluate the unit's ability to manage the recall and deployment of personnel and equipment in accordance with the Base Deployment Plan.

6.3.2.3.1.5. Evaluate the effectiveness of the flight to perform critical roles to support internal and external customers during all phases of contingency/wartime taskings.

6.3.2.3.1.6. Training/Qualifications. Evaluate the flight training program and its ability to meet the training objectives to include flight personnel qualifications.

6.3.2.3.1.7. Technical Operations. Evaluate teams and personnel in the following areas: conventional weapons, clandestine devices, chemical, aircraft, intelligence gathering, general demolitions, MK-series tools, communications and reconnaissance.

6.3.2.3.1.7.1. Response to accidents and incidents.

6.3.2.3.1.7.2. Evaluate the applications of protective measures against mission objectives, critical resources, and personnel.

6.3.2.3.1.7.3. Joint events will be considered when planning technical operation evaluations.

6.3.2.3.1.8. Logistical Support. EOD is equipped to support current tasking/missions, IAW USAF ESL, and AFI 21-201.

6.3.2.3.1.8.1. Evaluate flight equipment and maintenance process.

6.3.2.3.1.8.2. Evaluate facilities, ranges, and explosive tool areas.

6.3.3. Services:

6.3.3.1. Prime RIBS.

6.3.3.1.1. Deployment Planning. Evaluate the unit's ability to demonstrate capability to recall, organize, and deploy personnel IAW applicable mobility and deployment plans.

6.3.3.1.2. Employment. Evaluate deployed unit's ability to determine requirements and execute the Prime Ribs wartime theater support mission in the following sub-areas:

6.3.3.1.2.1. Unit Control Center. Evaluate unit's ability to establish a deployed unit control center in a timely manner. Review checklists, lines of communication, ability to communicate and interface with in-place command and other support agencies, delegation of authority, maintaining current status of personnel and capabilities, and maintain OPSEC/COMSEC/COMPUSEC.

6.3.3.1.2.2. Food Service/Troop Support. Consider procedures for requisitioning, inventory controls, storage controls, site set-up and layout, menu planning utilizing "A" and "B" Rations and Meals Ready to Eat, meal preparation procedures, customer service, control of sanitation and hygiene, maintain control of personnel, maintain safe operations, proficiently operate and maintain field equipment including M-2 Burners and immersion heaters, and effective utilization of available resources.

6.3.3.1.2.3. Field Lodging. Evaluate deployed unit's ability to determine beddown requirements and availability of bed spaces, site selection, beddown planning, assignment procedures, maintaining personnel

accountability and locator information, coordination with PERSCO for accuracy of locator data, maintaining safety and hygiene, and maintaining status and availability of bed spaces.

6.3.3.1.2.4. Field Exchange. Evaluate the unit's capability to establish and operate a deployed retail operation as applicable to UTC requirements.

6.3.3.1.2.5. Mortuary Operations. Evaluate the unit's ability to set up and operate a Mortuary Collection Point, ability to process remains to preserve identification media, ability to effectively communicate with applicable agencies, practice sanitation and hygiene, coordinate shipment (simulated) of remains, maintain accurate status and documentation, and effectively utilize available resources.

6.3.3.1.2.6. Fitness and Recreation. Determine ability to set up, operate, and maintain fitness and recreation programs within UTC capabilities. Include planning of group activities and self-directed type activities, ability to utilize, account for and maintain status of available resources, and ability to communicate effectively.

6.3.3.1.2.7. Laundry Service. Evaluate the unit's ability to establish, operate and/or maintain laundry services, demonstrate knowledge of accountability procedures, effectively utilize available resources, and/or set up self-help operations within UTC requirements.

6.3.3.1.2.8. Security. Determine unit's ability to survive and operate under hostile conditions. Evaluate ability to effectively communicate, accomplishment of security planning to include work party security, camouflage, concealment, and deception, personal weapons familiarity and handling, protection of resources and personnel, and response to chemical and/or biological warfare (active food preparation will continue during simulated chemical and/or biological scenarios).

6.3.4. Communications and Information. Special operations units assigned the tasks of providing Functional IM, Visual Information, and Automation support to the deployed commander and staff are operationally evaluated under these criteria. The inspection team will evaluate the functions' abilities to deploy and meet the AFSOF mission. During an ORI, any or all of the following areas may be evaluated: command and supervision, deployment, employment, and ability to survive and operate. Staff Support information managers will be evaluated as part of the functional area they are deployed to support.

6.3.4.1. Functional IM Support. Base-level functional IM support will only be evaluated in conjunction with the communications squadron.

6.3.4.2. Have procedures been established to inform customers of the level and scope of support that can and will be provided, i.e., bulletin, destruction facility, records storage, etc.?

6.3.4.3. Administrative Communications. Have procedures been established to process and distribute incoming and outgoing official, personal, and accountable mail?

6.3.4.3.1. Can personnel demonstrate mail bomb procedures?

6.3.4.3.2. Can personnel demonstrate contaminated mail procedures?

6.3.4.3.3. Have procedures been established for handling mail for casualties?

6.3.4.3.4. Have procedures been established for maintaining and administering the base locator?

6.3.4.3.5. Have procedures been established to ensure commercial postage meters or postage stamps are available for the BITS to place postage on official mail?

6.3.4.3.6. Are procedures established to process and distribute official mail received from the military post office?

6.3.4.3.7. Are procedures established to process and distribute personal mail through a postal service center or unit mailroom concept of delivery?

6.3.4.4. Records Management. Have procedures been developed for maintaining, protecting, and destroying records (hard copy and electronic; classified and unclassified)?

6.3.4.4.1. Can personnel demonstrate procedures for protecting and destroying classified documents and sensitive records?

6.3.4.4.2. Have procedures been established for processing FOIA requests?

6.3.4.5. Publishing. Have procedures been established to replenish forms and publications stocks?

6.3.4.5.1. Have sufficient security measures been established to safeguard sensitive publications and forms?

6.3.4.5.2. Have arrangements been made to obtain, on a continuing basis, new and updated electronic versions of publications and forms?

6.3.4.5.3. Can personnel demonstrate procedures for filling requisitions/requirements for publications/forms to customer account representatives?

6.3.4.6. Visual Information Support.

6.3.4.6.1. Printing Management. Have procedures been established to inform customers of the level and scope of support that can and will be provided?

6.3.4.6.1.1. Has a copier management program been established and procedures published for customers deploying with standard Air Force mobility copiers?

6.3.4.6.1.2. Can personnel operate and maintain the deployed duplicating center (DDC)?

6.3.4.6.1.3. Have procedures been established with DAPS for replacement and repairs of the DDC?

6.3.4.7. Automation Support.

6.3.4.7.1. Have procedures been established outlining responsibilities for automation support at deployed location?

6.3.5. Air Base Defense. Consider evaluating the following sub-areas when the unit is tasked to perform limited ABD operations:

6.3.5.1. Predeployment Planning. Preplanning, preparation, and training to conduct operations. The unit must be able to form part of a perimeter defense to detect, engage, and defeat threats before they terminate aircraft operations or other mission essential operations. Consider unit training, equipment, mission documentation and planning, and intelligence efforts when evaluating predeployment planning.

6.3.5.2. Preparation for Defensive Operations. Evaluate unit mobility recall, processing plans/procedures, and flight command and control procedures. This includes coordinating and meeting response times. Consider the command element's planning for sector defense, enemy situation, and the area of operation.

6.3.5.3. Conduct of the Defense. Evaluate all tasks and functions accomplished to sustain an effective defense of the area of operations. This includes execution of the operation order, following principles of base defense, implementing troop leading procedures, effective use of the reserve force, and execution of combat and reconnaissance patrol taskings.

6.3.5.4. Redeployment. Evaluate phase-out of operations, re-packing of assets, and subsequent movement of mobility resources to home station MOB or another employment location. This includes accounting for personnel and equipment, coordination of airlift requirements, and processing equipment, supplies, and personnel. Monitor equipment cleaning/turn in procedures and actions taken to accomplish necessary repairs.

6.3.5.5. Grading. The overall grading is assigned based on the unit's collective performance. Units will receive evaluation grades for home station security and deployed security.

6.3.6. Air Base Defense (ANG and AFRC). Consider the following subareas when evaluating ABD capability.

6.3.6.1. Predeployment Planning. Home station planning, preparation, and training to conduct operations. The unit must be able to form part of a perimeter defense to detect, engage, and defeat threats before they terminate aircraft operations or other mission essential operations. Consider unit training, equipment, mission documentation and planning, and intelligence efforts when evaluating pre-deployment planning.

6.3.6.2. Preparation for Defensive Operations. Evaluate unit mobility recall, processing plans/procedures, and flight command and control procedures. This includes coordinating and meeting response times. Consider the command element's planning for sector defense, enemy situation, and the area of operation.

6.3.6.3. Conduct of the Defense. Evaluate all tasks and functions accomplished to sustain an effective defense of the area of operations. This includes execution of the operation order, following principles of base defense, implementing troop leading procedures, effective use of the reserve force, and execution of combat and reconnaissance patrol tasking.

6.3.6.4. Redeployment. Evaluate the phase out of ABD operations, the repackaging of assets, and subsequent movement of mobility resources to home station or another employment location. This includes accounting for personnel and equipment, coordination of airlift requirements, and processing equipment, supplies, and personnel. Monitor equipment cleaning/turn in procedures and actions taken to accomplish necessary repairs.

6.3.6.5. Grading. The overall grading is assigned based on the unit's collective performance. Units will receive evaluation grades for deployed security.

6.3.7. Supply. The IG will evaluate the unit's ability to support wartime taskings.

6.3.7.1. Spares Support. Unit continues to maintain efficient and prompt supply support to home station and deployed unit tasking. The following will be evaluated:

6.3.7.1.1. Demonstrate the ability to effectively process priority supply requirements in a wartime environment.

6.3.7.1.2. Process partial/not mission capable supply requirements.

6.3.7.1.3. Units must demonstrate the ability to process intra-theater/CONUS lateral support requests.

6.3.7.1.4. Repairable assets must be tracked through the repair cycle.

6.3.7.1.5. Two Level Maintenance (2LM)/Lean Logistics (LL). Ensure 2LM/LL reparables are evacuated within 1 day.

6.3.7.1.6. Ensure Not Repairable This Station 1 items are shipped to appropriate repair facility

6.3.7.1.7. Ensure all other eligible assets are shipped to home station via Commando Express.

6.3.7.2. MRSP/RSP. Proper accountability, replenishment, and control are maintained over deployed readiness spares package assets. The following will be evaluated:

6.3.7.2.1. Security must be maintained at all times.

6.3.7.2.2. Accountability for assets must be maintained at all times and transactions must be properly documented.

6.3.7.2.3. Personnel must be able to perform duties; i.e., convert part numbers to stock numbers, locate property, issue assets, record transactions, manage dated items (shelf life), and take aggressive action to obtain assets not immediately available.

6.3.7.2.4. Proper warehouse practices must be accomplished, e.g. containers are serviceable, asset properly tagged and located, functional checks accomplished, etc.

6.3.7.2.5. Must be able to demonstrate the ability to transfer RSP records to the Air Force Contingency Supply Support (AFCSS).

6.3.7.2.6. Demonstrate the ability to use the DMAS to prioritize maintenance cannibalizations.

6.3.7.3. Ability to Survive and Operate. The following elements are evaluated:

6.3.7.3.1. Disperse MRSP/RSP/MSK for survivability.

6.3.7.3.2. Demonstrate the ability to prioritize requirements and reconstitute/replenish MRSP/RSP/MSK damaged/lost due to fire, battle damage, etc., using the DMAS.

6.3.7.3.3. Critical Spares identified prior to MRSP destruction using DMAS.

6.3.7.3.4. Destroyed MRSP/RSP/MSK message transmitted (simulated).

6.3.7.3.5. Demonstrate ability to adjust SBSS records.

6.3.7.3.6. Demonstrate the ability to manage/locate deployed mobility bag assets using the MAITS.

6.3.7.3.7. Demonstrate the capability to deny access to classified information and equipment to hostile forces (Base Denial Plan).

6.3.7.4. Fuels. Evaluate fuels support in the following two areas:

6.3.7.4.1. Fuel Support of Aircraft. Observe aircraft refueling operations supporting the ORI for timeliness and fuel servicing safety observance. Refueling operation modes include both hydrant fuel system and mobile refueler services to aircraft. Locations with no active hydrant fuel system will be evaluated by observation of mobile refueler services to aircraft. Ratings will be based on timely dispatch of the fuel servicing operators and required equipment, observance of all fuel servicing safety procedures, and use of designated TO and mandatory checklists. The rating period will begin when the fuel-servicing request is received at the Fuels Control Center and will end upon the fuel personnel and equipment departing the aircraft. Equipment malfunctions and non-operator related discrepancies will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. At locations having a Forward Area Refueling and Rearming Point (FARRP) commitment, evaluate fuel support to hot refueling operations using timelines listed in references under paragraph 5.3.5.5.7.

6.3.7.4.2. Failure to use the proper checklists is a minor discrepancy. A safety violation, which may potentially result in injury to personnel or damage to aircraft, equipment, or facilities, is a major discrepancy.

6.3.7.4.3. Timely fuel servicing response is defined as the time period specified in a Memorandum of Agreement/Understanding (MOA/MOU) between the fuels management officer and maintenance job control or specified in a fuels operating instruction.

6.3.7.4.4. Units are not scored if ORI aircraft have departed home station before the inspector is available to evaluate this area. Fuel support of ORI aircraft is not "staged" or simulated for grading purposes.

6.3.7.4.5. Failure to maintain and inspect FARRP servicing equipment IAW T.O. 37A9-7-2-1 is a minor discrepancy. Failure to perform proper test (annual hydrostatic hose and prior to each use Ohm test) is a safety violation, which is a major discrepancy.

6.3.7.4.5.1. Have procedures been established for FARRP teams recall for mission ready status within DOC response time? Is FARRP equipment maintained in a mission ready posture? Do FARRP team members possess all support/personal equipment necessary for immediate response at mission load time?

6.3.7.4.6. Petroleum Damage and Deficiency Reporting (REPOL) (N/A to ANG). Evaluate knowledge of fuels operations damage reporting. Rate timely notification of disaster response agencies when applicable and submission of a complete and accurate REPOL within prescribed time frames. An inspection team member may present an ORI exercise fuel damage/deficiency scenario to fuels personnel and evaluate the following areas: expeditious notification of appropriate disaster response agencies; length of time to submit a REPOL to the inspector and accuracy response agencies.

6.3.8. Transportation:

6.3.8.1. Evaluate ability of the Transportation Control Center (TCC), or equivalent for AFRES/ANG units, ability to generate, gain, and maintain command and control over transportation functions ensuring communication of pertinent information. Evaluate the currency and unit's compliance with checklists, recall/standby rosters, and applicable emergency response publications. Evaluate unit's practice of resource security IAW Base Deployment plans, Installation Security Plans, or other actions that would reasonably prevent enemy from gaining control of, or causing damage or harm to such resources. Assess overall unit's equipment and supplies sufficiency to support mission requirements, or that feasible alternative methods exist for obtaining such equipment and supplies.

6.3.8.2. Vehicle Operations Flight. Evaluate ability to expediently develop or utilize Priority Recall/Minimum Essential listings to support vehicle requirements IAW applicable Base Deployment Plans/Installation Security Plans, or approved user defined requirements to support mission. Evaluate unit's ability to ensure sufficient numbers of vehicles are available through the recall lists, commercial rental or through plans for commandeering privately owned vehicles (POVs). Evaluate unit's ability to ensure sufficient numbers of trained operators are available to include augmentees if necessary, to support mission requirements. Evaluate ability to gain and maintain accountability of assigned vehicles through use of local products or computerized means. Evaluate ability to establish and publish shuttle bus services to support base activities ensuring vehicles are available to support critical mission requirements. Evaluate dispatch personnel on training and familiarity with applicable deployed plans, checklists, rosters and emergency response publications. Evaluate operators on the use of 10-Series codes to increase COMSEC and eliminate unnecessary use of radio frequencies. Evaluate vehicle dispersal plans; are they documented, approved, and briefed to protect vehicles from mass destruction when centrally located.

6.3.8.3. Traffic Management Flight. Evaluate unit's ability to process priority (999, MICAPS, 777) cargo shipments within Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority (UMMIPS) time frames established in DOD 4500.32R, Chap 2, and AFI 24-201. Evaluate ability to prepare cargo for shipment, and follow planning steps and procedures, to include preparation of the Transportation Control and Movements Document IAW DOD4500.32R, Chap 2, and AFI24-201. Evaluate ability to pack and process hazardous cargo shipments for airlift IAW AFJMAN 24-204. Evaluate packing and processing procedures for classified shipments IAW DOD 5200.1-R and AFI 24-201. Evaluate proper clearance procedures of all shipments through Airlift Clearance Authority (ACA), IAW 4500.32R, Chap 2. Evaluate ability to return retrograde assets within time frames established in AFI 24-201, Atch 5.

6.3.8.4. Vehicle Maintenance. Evaluate unit's ability to ensure measures are taken IAW AFMAN 24-307, Chap 7, to support deployed sustainment operations.

6.3.9. Medical. Evaluate the integrated line and medical processes emphasizing the prompt and efficient treatment and movement of casualties from the site of injury, to a casualty collection point (CCP), through Patient Decontamination (if contaminated), to the Medical Aid Station, and/or on to higher levels of medical care. All or some of the following areas, depending on unit mission, will be evaluated IAW AFI 41-106, Medical Readiness Planning and Training, and AFSOC Medical Evaluation of Readiness and Individual Training (MERIT) Concept Plan:

6.3.9.1. Aeromedical Evacuation/Transload Operations. Evaluate emergency medical care rendered by pararescue and medical technicians from the objective area to the main/forward-operating base on AFSOC

aircraft, including transload/hand-off operations between pararescue and medical personnel. Emphasize efficient rendering of on board care and non-interference with the operational mission.

6.3.9.2. Casualty Collection Points. Evaluate the effectiveness of the transition of casualties from line Self-Aid/Buddy Care (SA/BC) to the formal medical system. Emphasize medical threat assessment, triage, emergency medical treatment, command and control, and prompt patient evacuation to next level of care.

6.3.9.3. Patient Decontamination Team. Evaluate decontamination procedures for both ambulatory and litter patients. Emphasize adequacy of decontamination techniques and procedures so as not to cause contamination of medical treatment personnel.

6.3.9.4. Medical Aid Station. Evaluate effectiveness of medical aid station supporting the deployed unit. Emphasize primary care support, medical response to nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) events, NBC detection and monitoring, triage and patient assessment, advanced trauma life support (ATLS) capabilities, patients stabilization and holding, command and control, medical reporting, medical regulating, and patient evacuation.

6.3.10. Legal Support: (IAW AFI 90-201).

6.3.10.1. Evaluate the knowledge of assigned personnel concerning their responsibilities under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Have all personnel received LOAC training? Is specialized training provided to aircrews, medical personnel, and Security Forces? Is timely and accurate advice supplied to commanders on LOAC issues?

6.3.10.2. Evaluate unit rules of engagement. Do they satisfy the requirements of US law and policy and international law?

6.3.10.3. Is legal support adequate for wartime and contingency operations?

6.3.10.4. Evaluate the availability of legal assistance for deploying personnel?

6.3.11. Contracting: (To be added)

6.3.12. Public Affairs. The mission of public affairs remains the same during all levels of contingencies or conflict -- develop and maintain an appropriate internal and public information program and, when appropriate, nurture the community support necessary for successful operations. The way these missions are performed will change as operations expand or contract. Evaluate public affairs' capability to rapidly deploy in support of the joint or unified command PA staff.

6.3.12.1. Initial Response.

6.3.12.1.1. Is the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) or a qualified representative on 24-hour call and listed on the command post or security forces notification roster?

6.3.12.1.2. If a personnel recall was initiated, did the PAO respond in a timely manner? Did all other PA personnel respond in a timely manner?

6.3.12.1.3. Was PA notified at the same time as other CAT members?

6.3.12.1.4. Did PA, if necessary, deploy on the first available aircraft?

6.3.12.1.5. Did PA deploy with other command support members?

6.3.12.1.6. Does PA have copies of the following Air Force Instructions: AFI 35-101, "Public Affairs Wartime Planning, Training, and Equipping", AFI 35-102, "Crisis Planning, Management and Response", AFI 35-201, "Community Relations", AFI 35-206, "Media Relations", and AFI 35-301, "Air Force Base Newspapers and Commercial Enterprise Publications Guidance and Procedures"?

6.3.12.1.7. Are key personnel biographies, unit fact sheets and appropriate photographs, or slides, up-to-date and on hand?

6.3.12.1.8. Equipment requirements will vary, depending on such factors as whether equipment is already on the ground or available locally; whether a flyaway kit or contingency kit exists; and how much pallet space is available in the initial deployment. However, the PAO should have a stand-alone or network personal computer; access to a local area network or wide area network; communications capability such as DDN (as a back up, DSN or commercial capabilities can be used); a modem (capable of at least 19,200 bits per second is desirable); a software package that allows the exchange of electronic mail and the transfer of data files to other systems, word processors with graphics capability. For field use, and as a backup system, PA should have a portable laptop computer with modem, printer, and power supply, preferably with software package that allows exchange of electronic mail and world wide web access.

6.3.12.1.9. Field package also should include the Associated Press Style Guide; Dictionary; Thesaurus; camera and film; and miscellaneous items such as pens, pencils, and steno pads. Does public affairs have these items?

6.3.12.1.10. If cleared and information is provided by the major command or theater command, the PA should provide host nation sensitivities, cultural information, and media training to deploying members.

6.3.12.1.11. In case of a major deployment or exercise, news media may ask questions. Is sufficient PA personnel available to answer queries?

6.3.12.1.12. Public Affairs will defer answering questions until guidance is received from higher command authorities. Did PA contact the MAJCOM/PA for guidance in a timely manner?

6.3.12.1.13. Did the PAO take steps to brief base personnel about not discussing with the media troop movements or the circumstances under which the force deployed? (Note: The briefing should also stress that family members not talk to the media about these issues.)

6.3.12.2. Employment:

6.3.12.2.1. Did the PAO contact the US Embassy nearest the deployed location to determine cultural and political sensitivities?

6.3.12.2.2. Did the PAO brief the unit commander on these issues?

6.3.12.2.3. Did the PAO get this information to the troops in a timely manner?

6.3.12.2.4. Theater transportation requirements must be estimated and requirements coordinated with the transportation OPR. The PAO requires the same types of transportation as the forces being supported. This is especially important for media escorts responsibilities. Has the PAO taken steps to ensure that transportation will be available?

6.3.12.2.5. Did the PAO contact the local community relations advisor (in countries where available) to help explain to the public the need for increased flying or nighttime flying activities when feasible?

6.3.12.3. Internal:

6.3.12.3.1. Did the PAO report to the Director, Joint Information Bureau or Combined Information Bureau or contact the base public affairs officer as applicable to discuss special operations specific PA mission requirements? Evaluate PA's ability to provide information via newsletters, briefings, and fliers consistent with Joint Information (JIB) or Combined Information Bureau (CIB) guidance and direction as applicable.

6.3.12.3.2. Are news items and editorials supporting internal information objectives included when appropriate?

6.3.12.3.3. Are newsletters placed in high-traffic areas such as dining hall, base exchange, and work centers?

6.3.12.3.4. Does PA periodically check distribution points to determine effectiveness?

6.3.12.3.5. Are articles from Air Force News Service, Armed Forces Press Service, and other major outside sources monitored for information to include in the newsletter?

6.3.12.3.6. Is the deployed commander using the PAO to get the necessary information to the deployed troops?

6.3.12.3.7. Is the PAO regularly attending the commander's staff meeting to impart and gather pertinent information?

6.3.12.4. Media Relations. Evaluate public affairs' ability to support the joint or unified command PA staff as directed.

6.3.12.4.1. Was a public affairs person in place when media arrived at the approved site?

6.3.12.4.2. Did PA escort media at all times while on a military installation?

6.3.12.4.3. Did the PAO obtain from the theater command PAO (through JIB or CIB, if applicable, or host base PAO a list of theater news correspondents and host nation and/or local media representatives to include in media list as appropriate?

6.3.12.4.4. Are procedures established to work with international media?

6.3.12.4.5. Does the PAO seek to know and provide material in the format requested by the different types of medium? Are the needs of each medium considered during news conferences?

6.3.12.4.6. Does the PAO maintain a log of media contacts and responses to queries?

6.3.12.4.8. Does the PAO offer media training to troops about to give interviews?

6.3.12.5. Media Releases. During military operations, news correspondents may come to possess sensitive or classified information that has not yet been officially released. Although the PAO can't censor or stop media from releasing this information, the PAO should make every reasonable attempt to prevent such information being transmitted or publicly released until officially released by American or allied release authorities for their own national forces.

6.3.12.5.1. Did the PAO explain US Military policy on this issue to the media and solicit the media's support?

6.3.12.5.2. Does the PAO try to ensure that casualty information inadvertently obtained by the media is not confirmed or released until the next of kin have been notified?

6.3.12.5.3. Does the PAO try to ensure that information released publicly is accurate, unclassified, and properly cleared?

6.3.12.5.4. Are all news media offered the Air Force story when feasible?

6.3.12.5.5. Is the PAO aware of individual media requirements and deadlines? If requirements and /or deadlines can not be met for operational reasons, does the PAO explain why the information is not available or when it will be available?

6.3.12.5.6. Do all Hometown News Release forms or other PAO-produced written forms to collect personal data for internal information and/or media release contain the required Privacy Act statement?

6.3.12.5.7. Does the PAO have a plan to obtain news services such as AP, USA Today, and other commercial news sources to apprise commanders and staff of how the media are covering operations.

6.3.12.5.8. Does the PAO have a channel of communication open to the higher command authority?

6.3.12.5.9. Does the PAO know how to contact the MAJCOM and SAF/PA on-call person when events have national news interest or the potential for adverse public reaction?

6.3.12.5.10. Is there a written plan to handle emergency situations such as a major incident or aircraft crash?

6.3.12.5.12. Does the PAO try to ensure that certain personal information is not to be released without individual consent? (Information not releasable without consent pertains to: Marital status, number and sex of dependents, gross salary of military personnel, civilian educational degrees, and major areas of study, school and year of graduation, home of record, home address and phone number, age and date of birth, Social Security Number, present or future assignments for overseas or for routinely deployable or sensitive units.)

6.3.13. Chaplain:

6.3.13.1. Wing Chaplains will ensure: The Chaplain Readiness Team (CRT) concept is used as the doctrine to provide religious support (AFH 52-103, para 1.1), CRT's are imbedded in Lead Combat Wing/Group Headquarters Core packages (AFH 52-103, para 1.2/figure 1.1), CRT members receive the mandatory Core training requirements as outlined in AFI 52 101, para 2.1, and CRT members prepare for deployment according to AFI 10-403 Chapter 5, para 5.2 Personnel Readiness and the USAF Chaplain Service Deployment Guide.

6.3.13.2. Mobility Processing Line: Wing Chaplains will ensure personnel in the 52R3 and 5R0X1 AFSC's will man the Chaplain Station at the Mobility Processing Unit (MPU). The Wing Chaplain will provide inclusive faith group religious literature, and ensure a chaplain is present or on standby to provide counseling. The MPU will provide a room to afford the chaplain an area for private counseling. Chaplain personnel at the MPU must have complete access to the Air Passenger Terminal in order to provide around the clock support to deploying personnel.

6.3.13.3. Deploying CRTs: CRTs tasked to deploy will process with all necessary equipment items; i.e., mobility boxes with religious support supplies, personal gear, chemical gear (if required) and weapons (enlisted only) if required for deployment. CRTs will begin active ministry to personnel on their chalk at time of processing.

6.3.13.4. Employment: CRTs will report to the senior deployed chaplain and/or site commander upon arrival at deployed location. In locations with permanent party chaplain personnel, CRT's will conduct a courtesy visit to the Wing Chaplain. CRT's primary responsibility is to develop and provide inclusive religious programming for the commander to support deployed personnel. This program will include but is not limited to worship, rites and liturgies, visitation program, counseling, and Commanders Crisis Action Team (CAT) duties. CRT's will secure a chapel facility/tent location, advertise location, times, and types of services offered. CRTs will be full participants in exercises to include but not limited to: Chemical attacks, conventional attacks, area sweeps for unexploded ordinances (UXO's), and mass casualty exercises.

6.3.14. Security Forces:

6.3.14.1. Evaluate the unit's ability to identify security requirements, based on wing/group deployment taskings. Evaluate unit's ability to analyze increased THREATCONs and implement appropriate force protection initiatives. Evaluate leadership's ability to continually and expeditiously inform the security force of available intelligence information. Evaluate unit's ability to organize, train, equip, and deploy AFSOC security teams, and conduct base defense when tasked. Assess effectiveness of AFSOC security teams in protecting special operations assets. To meet this goal, consider conducting at least four restricted area penetrations, one demonstration, and one other contingency action exercise. Evaluate effectiveness of the deployed security advisor as the principal security advisor to the mission commander. Evaluate unit's ability to produce and properly follow implementing instructions and checklists.

NOTE: Exercises used to assess the 352 SOG and 353 SOG will take into consideration Host Nation and theater limitations. JCS exercises may also limit ground rules.

6.3.14.2. Information Security. Evaluate unit's ability to provide proper protection for classified information and continuous evaluation/verification of personnel security clearances to perform tasked

missions throughout the deployment process. The compromise of classified information, which would jeopardize a mission or loss of life results in an unsatisfactory rating for this sub-area.

6.3.14.3. Weapons. Evaluate unit's ability to properly issue, clean, secure, and transport weapons and munitions throughout the deployment process.

6.3.14.4. Security Advisor. Evaluate the Security Advisor as the principal security advisor to the mission commander for force protection, physical security, resource protection and information security according to DOD, Air Force, and AFSCO standards.

6.3.15. Security Forces (ANG and AFRC). Evaluate the unit's ability to process and deploy personnel and equipment required by their UTC. Units may be tasked to provide security for their own unit's aircraft or augment another unit's security forces.

6.3.15.1. Security Planning. Evaluate the unit's internal/area security for deployed aircraft as outlined in each unit's UTC mission capability statement.

6.3.15.2. Deployment Planning. Evaluate the unit's ability to manage the recall and deployment of personnel and equipment in accordance with the Base Deployment Plan.

6.3.15.3. Security Force Operations. Evaluate the unit's command, control, management of security forces; effective CSC operations; and sentry proficiency to include use of force procedures and the ability to respond to simulated threat conditions. Units will be tasked to demonstrate a limited Air Base Defense (ABD) capability.

6.3.15.4. Security Procedures. Evaluate the command element and their assigned forces at deployed locations on their ability to plan and provide security for deployed resources IAW applicable security directives and unique situational conditions. In addition, evaluate security awareness and knowledge of security procedures.

6.3.16. Safety. Evaluate the unit's ability to identify safety hazards and recommend solutions at the deployed location.

6.3.16.1. Predeployment:

6.3.16.1.1. Flight Safety: Evaluate predeployment flight safety officers involvement in ensuring all flight safety concerns are addressed to include but not limited to the following areas: predeployment briefings, risk management applications, development of deployed aircraft parking and taxi plans, and safe deployment of aircraft from home station.

6.3.16.1.2. Ground Safety: Evaluate predeployed ground safety personnel involvement in ensuring all ground safety concerns are addressed to include but not limited to the following areas: predeployment briefings, risk management application, maintenance concerns, participate in advon visits to deployed location, etc.

6.3.16.1.3. Explosive Safety: Evaluate explosive safety personnel to include but not limited to overseeing of explosive storage and handling procedures and predeployment site surveys.

6.3.16.2. Deployment.

6.3.16.2.1. Flight Safety: Evaluate deployed flight safety officers involvement in ensuring all flight safety concerns are addressed to include but not limited to the following areas: incident reporting, risk management applications, aircraft deconfliction, aircraft parking and taxi plan, FAARP, Bash, and use of deployed flight safety officer guide.

6.3.16.2.2. Ground Safety: Evaluate deployed ground safety personnel involvement in ensuring all ground safety concerns are addressed to include but not limited to the following areas: maintenance facilities/practices, housing/work areas, flightline traffic flow, FAARP, dining facilities, etc.

6.3.16.2.3. Explosive Safety: Evaluate explosive safety personnel to include but not limited to overseeing of explosive storage and handling procedures at deployed locations.

Chapter 7

ABILITY TO SURVIVE AND OPERATE

7.1. General:

7.1.1. The actions to ensure the unit can continue to perform its wartime mission during periods of imminent or actual hostile attack. Evaluate the system to treat combat casualties, recover the wing/base in a trans-attack scenario and conserve the fighting force. The medical evaluation will be tailored to realistically support the exercise scenario.

7.2. Base-Wide Actions:

7.2.1. Evaluate ability of the unit to protect personnel and resources from attack.

7.2.1.1. Evaluate instructions given to the CAT regarding NBC hazards, shelter (hardening, activation) status, exposure control, alarm signals, lines of communication, damage assessment and recovery, contamination avoidance, specialized teams, military assistance to civil authorities, disperse, and fallout monitoring.

7.2.1.2. During ORI's shelters will be activated when it does not adversely impact host unit/nation support. Shelters should be stocked and manned for 24-hour operations. If shelters are not activated, procedures should be reviewed to ensure sufficient personnel, equipment, and supplies for 24-hour operations.

7.2.1.3. Evaluate proficiency of specialized teams and adequacy of equipment.

7.2.1.4. Evaluate proficiency of rescue, buddy-care, and evacuation of casualties.

7.2.1.5. Evaluate Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Cell.

7.2.1.6. Evaluate NBC recon teams.

7.2.2. Recovery After Attack and Natural Disaster (ACTIVE DUTY ONLY). Functional area inspectors should evaluate the unit's capability to organize and deploy personnel to accomplish facility/utility repair after enemy attack or natural disaster.

7.2.2.1. Check BCE Base Recovery Plan for completeness and accuracy.

7.2.2.2. Evaluate BCE damage control center's (DCC) ability to organize and prioritize damage inputs, control damage assessment and recovery teams, and disburse information to appropriate organizations.

7.2.2.3. Evaluate damage assessment teams ability to survey damage, report information as appropriate, and respond to DCC tasking.

7.2.2.4. Evaluate damage recovery teams ability to accomplish prioritized repairs.

7.2.2.5. Evaluate unit's ability to implement THREATCON according to the Installation Security Plan.

7.2.3. Survival Recovery Center (SRC) Operations. During base-wide exercises, evaluate the SRC's direction, coordination, and integration to ensure base survival before, during, and after an attack or disaster.

7.2.4. Nuclear/Biological/Chemical/Conventional (NBCC) Warfare. Exercises may be conducted at the deployed location to evaluate the unit's ability to survive and sustain mission capability under a combination of conventional and chemical attack events. Functional area inspectors will evaluate individual protective actions, detection and warning, contamination avoidance, decontamination operations, and functional area's ability to support the unit mission in a NBCC warfare environment.

7.2.4.1. Individual Protective Actions. Evaluate personnel on their use of protective equipment, CW antidotes, personnel decontamination kits, and response to alarm signals.

7.2.4.2. Detection and Warning. Evaluate personnel on their ability to detect, identify, and report chemical agents and mark contaminated areas.

7.2.4.3. Contamination Avoidance. Evaluate the unit's protection of personnel and mission essential assets from contamination.

7.2.4.4. Decontamination. Evaluate the decontamination of aircraft, personnel, equipment, and areas.

7.2.4.4.1. Vehicle Decontamination. Evaluate proficiency of the vehicle decontamination team and adequacy of equipment. Evaluate contamination control and avoidance to reduce or stop the spreading of contamination. Decontamination efforts should be limited to avoiding the spread of contamination on vehicles, equipment, work locations, and mission essential operational areas.

7.2.4.5. Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception. Units must demonstrate capability.

7.2.4.6. Units will be evaluated on black out procedures.

7.2.4.7. Units will be evaluated on how they disperse their assets.

7.3. Self-Aid/Buddy Care (SA/BC):

7.3.1. Evaluate the effectiveness of the line SA/BC Program IAW AFI 36-2238, Self-Aid and Buddy Care Training, and AFSOC Medical Evaluation of Readiness and Individual Training (MERIT) Concept Plan.

7.4. Munitions Storage and Handling:

7.4.1. Evaluate unit's ability to properly store and handle munitions in a dynamic environment. Evaluate units ability to properly secure and safeguard stored asset.

7.4.2. Munitions Material. Evaluate the storage facility for proper quantity distance, munitions computability, security, and safety to ensure compliance with applicable directives.

7.4.3. Munitions handling. Evaluate the units munitions control functions, munitions accountability, munitions inspections, personnel training, and delivery procedures to ensure compliance with applicable directives.

7.4.4. Munitions Control. Evaluate security of munition assets. Evaluate control of key, lock and access inventories. Evaluate emergency action procedures.

7.4.5. Munitions accountability. Evaluate asset balance, condition, and code shelf/service life of on hand assets. Evaluate issue, receipt, and document transactions of inventories.

GEORGE C. FERKES, Col, USAF
Inspector General

Distribution X:

HQ AFRC/IMPM (2)

HQ AFIA/IM (4)

AFIGAC (4)

ANGRC (4)

ANGSC (2)

HQ SAF/XOO/XOOTC (10)

SAF/IG (10)

Attachment 1**THE AFSOC FORM 19, INSPECTION COMMUNICATION**

AFSOC form 19s were designed to provide the units and the IG written documentation of the normal communication which occurs between inspected units and the IG during ORIs. The form should be filled out in triplicate with the original and 2nd copy going to the responding unit/IG. Once answered, the original is returned and with the second copy remaining with the organization who responded.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNIT TO THE IG

Block “A”: Check appropriate box.

“From”: Senior CAT or Commander’s Representative, Rank, Unit, and Phone Number.

1. IG will assign official control number. Unit may use their own internal numbering system for tracking as well.

Text:

- a. For simulation requests, include answers to the following questions:
WHAT? (Describe the simulated task or equipment.)
HOW? (Describe how you will simulate the task.)
WHY? (Provide a brief explanation of the need for simulation and the impact if the simulation is disapproved.)
- b. Requests for clarification from the IG.
- c. Official questions concerning the ORI.
- d. Information only.

2. Self-explanatory.

3. “Signature”: Senior CAT or Commander representative approving the form.

4. “Date Time”: Given to the IG or placed in the IG Distribution box.

Block “B”: IG checks appropriate boxes.

Text: Answer requests for simulation, clarification, or official questions and give any limitations or conditions.

5. “Name/Grade/Title”: Of individual answering the form.

6. “Signature”: Team Chief, IGI, IG, or designated senior representative.

7. “Date Time”: Answer completed and delivered to unit CAT/Senior Representative/CC.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE IG TO THE UNIT

Block "A": Check appropriate box.

"From": Team Chief, IGI, IG, or designated senior representative.

1. "Control Number": Will be assigned by the IG.

Text:

- a. Requests for clarification from the unit.
- b. Official questions concerning the ORI.
- c. Information only.

2. Self-explanatory.
3. "Signature": Team Chief, IGI, IG, or designated senior representative.
4. "Date Time": Given to the CAT/Senior Representative/Commander.

Block "B": Unit checks appropriate boxes.

Text: Answer request for clarification, questions, or acknowledges receipt for info.

5. "Name/Grade/Title": Of individual answering the form.
6. "Signature": Commander, Senior CAT representative, or designated representative.
7. "Date Time": Answer completed and delivered to the IG or placed in the IG distribution box.